# Space Force Starter

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# \*\*\*AFF\*\*\*

## 1AC – Plan Text

### The United States Department of Defense should establish a Space Force under the United States Armed Forces as per Title 10 of National Security Space. The United States Department of Defense should delegate that the Space Force has a distinct and legitimate area of responsibility in the Unified Plan Command over Space Control, Space Support, and Force Application missions, including Rapid Decisive Operations.

## 1AC – Inherency 1/2

### U.S. is beginning to lose its competitive edge in space – satellites are vulnerable

Gates & Clapper ’11 (Robert M: Secretary of Defense; James R.: Director of National Intelligence, “National Security Space Strategy: Unclassified Summary,” January 2011. < http://www.espi.or.at/images/stories/dokumente/diverse/NationalSecuritySpaceStrategyUnclassifNationalSe\_Jan2011.pdf> LV)

Space is increasingly competitive. Although the United States still maintains an overall edge in space capabilities, the U.S. competitive advantage has decreased as market-entry barriers have lowered (see Figure 3). The U.S. technological lead is eroding in several areas as expertise among other nations increases. International advances in space technology and the associated increase in foreign availability of components have put increased importance on the U.S. export control review process to ensure the competitiveness of the U.S. space industrial base while also addressing national security needs. U.S. suppliers, especially those in the second and third tiers, are at risk due to inconsistent acquisition and production rates, long development cycles, consolidation of suppliers under first-tier prime contractors, and a more competitive foreign market. A decrease in specialized suppliers further challenges U.S. abilities to maintain assured access to critical technologies, avoid critical dependencies, inspire innovation, and maintain leadership advantages. All of these issues are compounded by challenges in recruiting, developing, and retaining a technical workforce.

1AC – Inherency 2/2

### The creation of a Space Force solves – allows for effective weaponization of space through a new branch of the military

Dinerman, author and journalist for The Space Review, ’06 (Taylor, February 27, “United States Space Force: sooner rather than later” <http://www.thespacereview.com/article/565/1>)

The most important reason the US Department of Defense needs a Space Force is that space has different properties from land, sea, and air environments found on Earth. The “terrain” of the Earth-Moon system combines orbital dynamics and gravitational forces in constant and sometimes subtle interaction. Senior officers, no matter how sincere, whose formative experiences consist of flying machines that are supported by the relationship between propulsion and air pressure cannot be expected to instinctively understand the nature of space warfare. The small space cadre that is slowly coming into existence will, without doubt, never produce an Air Force Chief of Staff. A new space service, with its own promotion ladder and its own training and doctrine development system, will insure that when the Joint Chiefs and their civilian superiors meet to plan an operation, someone with four stars will be there to make sure that the capabilities and limitations of US and enemy space forces are taken into account. Military space expertise is becoming more widespread than ever and even the least sophisticated future foe will know enough to try and avoid being detected or targeted by US or allied satellites. With its own budget, the space service will be able to concentrate on making sure that all the other services have access to the best space-based support possible. The Army, Navy, Marines, Coast Guard, and others who use America’s military space assets will not have to worry about institutional favoritism, although it should be pointed out that, since 2001, there has not been any evidence that the USAF has abused its authority to the detriment of the other services. Instead, the problem is that, within the Air Force, there has not been enough top-level attention paid to the needs of space operations. A new USSF should not get control of everything that now comes under the heading of “Air Force Space.” For example, the ICBM force should continue to be controlled by the USAF. In contrast, the new organization should take control of the space-based elements of all missile defense systems, including tactical ones. Missile warning and tracking is a global requirement that can best be done from space. SBIRS and its successors will need to be controlled by space warfare experts controlling networks that can instantly pass information on to those who can shoot the enemy target down. The Space Force will, eventually, control space-based anti-ballistic missile weapons, anti-satellite weapons, satellite defense weapons and space-to-Earth weapons when US policy makers decide that these systems are needed. The new force will also get control of the GPS and military communications networks and of the space access infrastructure. This will give them control of the Delta 4, Atlas 5, and other rockets. It will be up to the new force to continue the recent record of safe and successful military space launch operations. The Space Force will have the responsibility for developing new launch systems, including laying the basis for a future reusable launch vehicle (RLV). With its own budget, the space service will be able to concentrate on making sure that all the other services have access to the best space-based support possible. Every major, and many smaller, joint headquarters will have a representative of the USSF present and with a legitimate seat at the table. In order to show their commitment to support the troops who carry the greatest burden, the USSF should, on a day-to-day basis, wear fatigues rather than flight suits. This will also make it plain to members of the Army, Navy, and Marines who will be joining the new organization that it is not just another version of the Air Force. It will be able to make its acquisition decisions based on the need to keep a healthy American space industry in existence, rather than catering to the needs of the aerospace industry. This should allow for a new set of corporate players to get involved alongside the older large contractors. As the Space Force proves itself, Congress may be expected to show a greater level of confidence and allow needed systems, such as Space Radar and the TSAT communications satellite program, to be fully funded. Leaders inside the Pentagon keep saying that space is the critical backbone of network-centric warfare. The evidence shows that, without space, American global military superiority would not be anywhere near what it is today. Our enemies know this and are working hard to find new ways to damage and degrade US space superiority. To counter this, and to give America a new set of grand strategic options, a new space force is needed: not immediately, but within the next five or ten years. Future presidential candidates, if they want to show they are serious about national security, should consider making this reform part of their platform.

## 1AC Advantage 1 – China 1/6

### China is threatening US space supremacy inviting a preemptive strike – offensive maneuvers by China in space spark a global arms race

Denmark 2010 - Fellow with the Center for a New American Security [By Abraham M. and Dr. James Mulvenon CNAS, Jan, Contested Commons: The Future of American Power in a Multipolar World <http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS%20Contested> %20Commons%20Capstone\_0.pdf Accessed Jun 21]

In an environment where all the stray bullets, mortars and bombs do not simply fall to Earth, but continue to fly around the world for decades, rendering much of the surface of the Earth uninhabitable. Similarly, orbits littered with debris from a kinetic anti-satellite campaign would be useless for the satellites upon which the global economy depends. This fragility represents an Achilles’ heel for the space commons and the U.S. military. The relative dependence of the U.S. on space makes its space systems potentially attractive targets. Many foreign nations and non-state entities are pursuing space-related activities. … An attack on elements of U.S. space systems during a crisis or conflict should not be considered an improbable act. If the U.S. is to avoid a “Space Pearl Harbor” it needs to take seriously the possibility of an attack on U.S. space systems. Burgeoning ASAT Capabilities: A growing number of states have recognized American reliance on space, have access to space, and are developing capabilities to exploit U.S. vulnerabilities. 77 Recent developments demonstrate that access to, and use of, space is becoming increasingly contested. These developments threaten the American way of war, given the U.S. military’s use of space for everything from logistics to Command, Control, Communications, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C3ISR). These developments also threaten the space commons in general: China successfully tested a direct-ascent anti-satelite missile in January 2007, which created over 35,000 pieces of debris larger than 1 centimeter. 78 China also reportedly used lasers to temporarily blind an American satellite in 2006. Russia provided Iraq with GPS jammers in 2003, • which were somewhat successful in countering American precision-strike weapons. 80 Several states and non-state actors have used radio and cyber capabilities to disrupt or degrade an adversary’s space capabilities. Indonesia jammed a Chinese-owned satellite. Iran and Turkey have jammed satellite broadcasts of national dissidents. 81 In 2003, Iran jammed satellite broadcasts of Voice of America, and in March of that year, Iran jammed GPS signals. In 1999, hackers attacked a British satellite via cyberspace. In 2008, Brazilian hackers were arrested for using homemade communications dishes to “hijack” transponders on a U.S. Navy satellite. 82 More recently, the Iranian government reportedly jammed U.S. satellite and radio broadcasts during the protests surrounding its 2009 presidential election. The threshold to access space is lowering, allowing several countries to develop indigenous abilities to access and operate in space. While these efforts are primarily commercial and civilian in focus, many new space programs have military components. In May 2008, Japan’s legislature passed a law ending a ban on the use of its space program for defense. France’s new defense white paper calls for doubling investment in space assets, including spy satellites. In late June, India announced that it would “optimize space applications for military purposes,” and one of its most senior military officers candidly stated: “With time we will get sucked into a military race to protect our space assets, and inevitably there will be a military contest in space. ” 83 Space may, in the coming decades, be more accessible to non-state actors. The high costs associated with developing, putting into orbit, and maintaining assets in space have, to date, kept space a domain for states, but costs are falling. Private companies have been attempting to develop relatively cost-effective space platforms for commercial launch purposes. The companies Scaled Composites and Virgin Galactic have developed a craft, White Knight Two, which they hope will carry a manned space capsule into orbit. In future years, it is possible (if not likely) that advanced high-altitude flight capabilities demonstrated by the White Knight Two will proliferate, making low orbit accessible for actors that do not have the resources to develop a full-fledged space program. The implications of new actors operating within the space commons are potentially significant. Long the domain of the United States and the Soviet Union, space in the coming decades will become more crowded, with inexperienced actors who may not have responsible mentorship of the space commons in mind. Indeed, some may use space to strike at the United States and the international system, a kind of terrorism in zero gravity.

1AC Advantage 1 – China 2/6

### Chinese ASAT development will deter the US from protecting Taiwan by exploiting asymmetric vulnerability

The Straits Times 2007 [“China takes the arms race into space; It may be testing technology it has acquired but there is a political price”, Jonathan Eyal, Jan 22 Accessed on June 24, 2011 at lexisnexis.com]

WESTERN governments have known about Beijing's space efforts for years. The challenge for intelligence services now is to guess what is China's military ultimately seeking to achieve with its reported Jan 11 anti-satellite missile test. China's successful use of what military experts call a 'kinetic kill vehicle' - a missile which destroys a target by hitting it at high speed - may look spectacular, but the technology is well-known; both the United States and the Soviet Union tested it two decades ago. Contrary to received opinion, the Russians and the Americans abandoned their tests not so much because they were worried about the impact on the environment from the large amount of debris, but more because the use of such weapons could have been misinterpreted by an opponent then as the start of a nuclear war. But the world has changed since then. The world's most advanced militaries and much of the global economy rely on satellites. America's predominance in this field is overwhelming: out of about 850 active spacecraft now orbiting the Earth, over half are US-owned. For anyone seriously interested in standing up to the US, the ability to make such satellite vulnerable is not a luxury, but a necessity. And the Chinese military has further incentives to excel in this field. For, unlike the Soviet Union, China never sought to match the Americans weapon-for-weapon but, rather, to develop 'killer' technologies which can wipe out US technological advantages. The Chinese space programme fits perfectly into such strategy. Beijing must have been aware that, by testing its missile capabilities now, it will pay a heavy political price. The chorus of condemnation is extensive, and it includes not only the US, Japan and the European Union, but also Russia, whose military edge is equally threatened. The test also sits awkwardly with repeated Chinese claims of peaceful intentions. And it undermines China's own diplomacy, which has long called for an international treaty to prevent the military use of space. So the most plausible explanation for China's test: it has acquired a technology which it has sought for more than a decade, and was keen to test it. Beijing may have calculated that the political backlash will not matter, since the Americans are already engaged in similar projects. After all, the latest US space policy, outlined in a paper released last October, declared Washington's intention to 'preserve its rights, capabilities and freedom of action in space... and deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to US national interests'. The main Chinese objective may not be a direct confrontation with America, but just to raise the price which the US has to pay in defending Taiwan. The name of the game is what military experts call 'access denial', forcing the US to keep its distance from what Beijing considers as its regional interests. In the short-term, some of America's most important space assets are not threatened, since they fly at much higher altitudes. But the US will have to respond, in a variety of ways. These could include the launch of many smaller satellites, coupled with decoys which can fool Chinese defences. American anti-missile technology will also be improved, in order to deprive Beijing of its advantage. Hardliners in Washington are now gearing up for a new arms race. The Heritage Foundation has already suggested spending 'billions or tens of billions of dollars a year, pretty much year in and year out'. The US Administration may resist such demands for the moment. Yet there is no question that the world has just experienced a historic event. A military race has now moved into space. And America now identifies China as the only country able and willing to challenge its technological supremacy. The future looks rosy for military industries. But not for Asian stability.

### Taiwan is the most plausible scenario for Chinese ASAT attack

MacDonald 2008 – Council on Foreign Relations [Bruce, Council Special Report No. 38 September China, Space Weapons, date accessed : June 24th, 2011, http://www.cfr.org/china/china-space-weapons-us-security/p16707]

War between China and the United States seems unlikely, given their increasing economic interdependence and ongoing efforts in both countries to improve relations. Looming in the background, however, is the possibility of war over Taiwan, a plausible if unlikely scenario that could bring the United States and China into conflict. China might then be tempted to attack U.S. military satellites as a casualty free way to signal resolve, dissuade Washington from further involvement in a Taiwan conflict, and significantly compromise U.S. military capabilities if such dissuasion failed. Such Chinese actions could well escalate any conflict between the United States and China. As a result, both countries have interests in avoiding the actual use of counterspace weapons and shaping a more stable and secure space environment for themselves and other spacefaring nations, which could easily be caught in the undertow of a more militarily competitive space domain.

1AC Advantage 1 – China 3/6

### China will escalate the conflict – perception of rational escalation ensures US gets drawn into the nuclear arms race

Glaser, PolSci Prof at George Washington, ’11 (Charles, March/April, “Will China’s Rise Lead to War?” Foreign Affairs, Vol 90 Issue 2, EbscoHost)

ACCOMMODATION ON TAIWAN? THE PROSPECTS for avoiding intense military competition and war may be good, but growth in China's power may nevertheless require some changes in U.S. foreign policy that Washington will find disagreeable--particularly regarding Taiwan. Although it lost control of Taiwan during the Chinese Civil War more than six decades ago, China still considers Taiwan to be part of its homeland, and unification remains a key political goal for Beijing. China has made clear that it will use force if Taiwan declares independence, and much of China's conventional military buildup has been dedicated to increasing its ability to coerce Taiwan and reducing the United States' ability to intervene. Because China places such high value on Taiwan and because the United States and China--whatever they might formally agree to--have such different attitudes regarding the legitimacy of the status quo, the issue poses special dangers and challenges for the U.S.-Chinese relationship, placing it in a different category than Japan or South Korea. A crisis over Taiwan could fairly easily escalate to nuclear war, because each step along the way might well seem rational to the actors involved. Current U.S. policy is designed to reduce the probability that Taiwan will declare independence and to make clear that the United States will not come to Taiwan's aid if it does. Nevertheless, the United States would find itself under pressure to protect Taiwan against any sort of attack, no matter how it originated. Given the different interests and perceptions of the various parties and the limited control Washington has over Taipei's behavior, a crisis could unfold in which the United States found itself following events rather than leading them. Such dangers have been around for decades, but ongoing improvements in China's military capabilities may make Beijing more willing to escalate a Taiwan crisis. In addition to its improved conventional capabilities, China is modernizing its nuclear forces to increase their ability to survive and retaliate following a large-scale U.S. attack. Standard deterrence theory holds that Washington's current ability to destroy most or all of China's nuclear force enhances its bargaining position. China's nuclear modernization might remove that check on Chinese action, leading Beijing to behave more boldly in future crises than it has in past ones. A U.S. attempt to preserve its ability to defend Taiwan, meanwhile, could fuel a conventional and nuclear arms race. Enhancements to U.S. offensive targeting capabilities and strategic ballistic missile defenses might be interpreted by China as a signal of malign U.S. motives, leading to further Chinese military efforts and a general poisoning of U.S.-Chinese relations.

1AC Advantage 1 – China 4/6

### China is intent on taking over Earth by establishing military dominance in space- only the creation of a US Space Force can stop this by taking us beyond hegemony- American power will be invincible and eternal, guaranteeing world peace and ending terrorism- forever.

Yoshida, B.C. Director of the Freedom Institute, Author of The Nothern Abyss, Noted Political Commentator, Columnist for the Greenwich Village Gazette, 2003 (Adam, Oct 10th, “Red China Shooting for the Moon”, Freedom Institute Magazine, [http://www.adamyoshida.com/2003\_10\_01\_archive.html](http://www.adamyoshida.com/2003_10_01_archive.html" \t "_blank) )

If all goes according to plan on October 15th the Peopleâ€™s Republic of China will become the third country (after the United States and the Soviet Union) to independently launch a man into space. The craft, named Shenzhou (or â€˜Divine Vesselâ€™) 5, along with its occupant is scheduled to remain in space for nearly a full day, orbiting the earth fourteen times. This is a critical step in Communist China’s plan to establish itself as dominant in space. It must be recalled that just seven years passed between John Glennâ€™s fight space flight and the American landing on the Moon. During that time the United States was required to develop virtually all of the technology involved in the process. Much of that technology is today readily available, as a result the time between China’s first manned space launch and China’s (already-planned) trip to the Moon could be much shorter. Present plans would see a Chinese Lunar base by the year 2010. This is a serious threat to the national security of the United States and that of all free people. In the military sphere space is the ultimate high ground. Whoever controls the stars shall control the destiny of the earth. The Military Dimensions of Space:  Already, as it stands today, we are dependent upon space for reconnaissance, communications, and the global positioning system. The capabilities provided in these areas by space-based assets are irreplaceable. Were somebody able to destroy those assets the American military would be essentially crippled. Tomahawk Cruise Missiles and JDAM bombs would not be able to be targeted. Communications systems would be severely disrupted. Nuclear early-warning systems would not function. US intelligence, both the type garnered via both direct observation and signals intelligence would be inoperable. In other words, absent-space based systems, the US military would lack all capacity for offensive operations of any serious sort. The Chinese mean to establish military superiority over the United States. Unlike the American movement into space, which was a mostly civilian affair, the Chinese are moving with an obvious military purpose. Once they establish their ability to reliably move people into space, they will rapidly produce manned orbital space stations and, unlike the bizarre International Space Station, these Chinese stations will have a military purpose. They will almost certainly be covertly armed with anti-satellite weapons. This will allow the Chinese to contest the United States for control of space, thereby negating the greatest of American advantages in any future conflict with China. All of this, I might add, fails to take into account the future military utility of space. Not only will many of the more effective anti-missile weapons be deployed in space (lasers, â€˜brilliant pebbleâ€™ mines, and such), but space also offers serious possibilities for attacks against targets upon the Earth. Space-based nuclear weapons could hit targets seconds after their launch. Rocks dropped from space could prove to be devastatingly effective kinetic-energy weapons. All of this leads to two natural conclusions. First, America must maintain and expand its presence in the stars, if only because it is essential to the future dominance of the American military upon the Earth. Second: measures, even extreme measures, must be taken to prevent the emergence of a competitor in space. Countering  Chinese Extraterrestrial Expansionism: The fight against the Chinese in space must move on two fronts. Not only must the United States bring its space program back into gear- but it also must take steps to slow down and, where possible, halt the Chinese space program. I will begin with the latter. Fighting to stop the Chicom program will take resolve, daring, and a cold willingness to kill where necessary. Great amounts of money can be used to induce some Chinese scientists to defect. Others can be blackmailed through the uncovering and use of personal peccadilloes. Those bought off or threatened into compliance can be used to sabotage the program both through deliberately delaying research and, occasionally, through direct action. The experience of NASA shows that any number of small errors can lead to the loss of a craft and a crew. It hardly strikes me as impossible that, with the right sort of threat or inducement, some people might not be convinced to deliberately create such errors during Chinese launches, thereby increasing the natural rate of loss in both equipment and personnel. The more Chinese astronauts who die and the more craft which explode or crash the better it will be for the forces of freedom. This would be especially desirable because, after one or two such losses, the Chinese would (rightly) attribute those losses to sabotage and descend upon with a blanket of scrutiny which would serve to cripple the development and planning of future missions. If possible, it might also be worthwhile to arrange a few losses of Chinese craft in flight. Perhaps a few satellites could be launched, ostensibly for some civilian purpose, and equipped to allow them to collide with a Chinese capsule in mid-flight. Such losses could, presumably, be blamed on Chinese incompetence. However, disrupting the Chicom program is simply part of the answer. In order to fully meet the challenge America must be ready to go back into space. More than that, the renewed American interest in space must be of a much more militaristic character than previous forays. The most obvious answer is to strip NASA of its primary responsibility in this area. NASA does fine work- but it’s a civilian agency with a civilian mission. The new American duty in space is not to simply explore, to visit the Moon, dispatch probes to Mars, or study far-distant stars. It is now a classically military mission. US forces must safeguard US assets in space and threaten the assets of others. American forces in space require the ability to kill stuff and break things. This is not a mission for any one of the services. It is a mission for all of them. Small craft, akin to those used by the Air Force, will be required. As, eventually, will larger ships, such as those that the Navy is familiar with. Ground troops will be needed to defend various extra-terrestrial installations. The United States Space Force: The unique mission in space, combined with the need for a solid focus on the area, calls for the establishment of an entirely new branch of the Armed Forces. This branch, which would be designated as the ˜Space Force” would have a dedicated budget and a single mission, thereby avoiding the problems created where space is only part of the mission of a service and it is thereby forced to take a secondary priority to more Earth-bound concerns. The Space Force would have control of all military missions in space- including ballistic missile defense (perhaps even control over ABM systems could be turned over to the service). Most important, by launching an independent Space Force with a relatively large budget (perhaps $20 billion a year to begin) and entrusting that budget to skilled military officers (who would, hopefully, be given very wide latitude to experiment) the advancement of space technology would become self-perpetuating. Over time the mission of the Space Force would evolve. Initially its tasks would be confined to the Earth’s orbit: attacking enemy satellites, shooting down ballistic missiles, and protecting vital orbital installations. However, in a relatively short amount of time, that role would evolve to include more offensive missions. Weapons would be built to attack targets upon the Earth. Orbital weapons would be required to intercept enemy hypersonic bombers and, perhaps, protect American ones. Advanced military spacecraft might be launched from orbit to attack Earth-based targets. The advent of the first military spacecraft would lead to the creation of more advanced platforms from which to launch them and ships from which to attack those platforms. In other words, merely beginning to move down this road will set off a revolution in military technology. The development of advanced weapons will, inevitably, lead to the development of other, even more advanced weapons and the further spread of technology. As ship drives and weapons speed improve, the area of militarized space would increase, thereby giving humanity further reason to expand outwards from the Earth. Manifest Destiny: My final suggestion is going to sound absurd, but I mean it sincerely. The United States ought to immediately withdraw from the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. The treaty, a Cold War relic, hinders the United States in two areas. First, it bans the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction in outer space, thereby preventing the deployment of useful military weapons in this sphere. Second, the treaty states that, Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means? In effect, this prohibits any nation which is a party to the treaty from annexing any territory beyond the Earth. This is a serious impediment to any future plans for the development of space, essentially placing all lands beyond the Earth under a sort of nebulous international administration. The United States should, as is provided for in Article Sixteen of the Treaty, provide notice to all other signatories that the United States is withdrawing from the treaty. One year to the day later, as provided for under the treaty, the United States Government should declare, citing the fact that Americans were the first humans to set foot on the Moon, that it is now the sovereign territory of the United States of America. Efforts should be made to rapidly send human expeditions to Mars and Saturn’s moon of Titian, the two other most valuable planets in the Solar System, to make a claim on similar grounds.Why, you might ask, would anyone want the Moon? There are several answers. By some accounts the Moon may contain vast quantities of hidden water or other resources which might be valuable either on the Earth or in fueling further spaceward expansion. The proximity of the Moon would allow for the construction of a large base, free of the Earth’s atmosphere, for the staging of further operations (using rockets, it would be much easier to launch a mission to Mars from the Moon than from the Surface of the Earth), for the training of astronauts (imagine a zero-g boot camp!) and for military operations elsewhere in the Solar System (or even in Earth orbit). More than that, the acquisition of the Moon and other planets would help to promote patriotism and generate enthusiasm for spaceflight. While, at present, trips beyond the atmosphere of the Earth are grossly expensive, who is to say that they will remain that way forever? We might find, a few decades hence, that the Moon will, with regular support from the Earth, be a popular vacation spot capable of sustaining a large permanent population. The possibilities are limitless. A Flight to a Better Future: Ceding military control of space to China would end Americas status as a Superpower and create an entirely new world order. An American seizure of space would make permanent American hegemony. The development of an advanced system of space-based weapons, along with a powerful support structure, would elevate America from being, by far, the most militarily powerful nation in the history of the world to being, to put it simply, militarily invincible. How do you fight an enemy who can, moments after you attack, zero in on your home and pulverize it with a rock dropped from orbit? How do you fight an enemy whose forces have sophisticated equipment which allows them to track their own position, uncover yours, and call in precise fire upon you? How do you fight an enemy whose bombers can be over your capital minutes after the decision to go to war is taken, who can drop precision weapons on all of your high value targets, and who possesses weapons which will destroy every modern electronic within a radius of miles? The answer is simple: you can’t. Certainly, people would still be capable of launching terrorist attacks on the Earth- but retaliation would be swifter and more brutal. Moreover, under the threat of orbital bombardment, many earth-based polities would have a strong incentive to cease playing games with terrorists. The era of conventional military conflicts on the Earth would, more or less, be over. Once one power has space and is resolved to keep it, no other power will be able to easily break through the bottleneck. Assuming that America’s leadership retains its resolve, American domination of space would become a permanent feature of world affairs. China, I think, understands all of this. That is why they are now rushing forwards on their own space program. Space is an untested area, one where American domination is less than absolute. They must be stopped. Everything that will follow depends upon it.

## 1AC Advantage 2 – Hegemony 1/4

### Space militarization is inevitable and underway- the US enjoys preeminence now but our failure to create a separate Space Force is in the SQ will undermine dominance

Gayl, Deputy Head of the Space and IO Integration Branch, Science Advisor to the Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations, 2003 (Franz J, Nov 17th, “The Military Space Service: Why It's Time Has Come”, Space Daily, [http://www.spacedaily.com/news/milspace-03zh.html](http://www.spacedaily.com/news/milspace-03zh.html" \t "_blank) )

The future of U.S. supremacy in space is in jeopardy. New entrants to [space exploration](http://www.spacedaily.com/news/milspace-03zh.html" \t "_blank), rich in both intellectual capital and superpower ambitions, are pressing irresistibly forward. These include formidable past competitors, such as China and Russia, as well as India, Japan, Europe, and others. If the stakes were only related to commercial advantage or national [scientific](http://www.spacedaily.com/news/milspace-03zh.html" \t "_blank) pride these independent initiatives would be welcome in the spirit of peaceful globalization. Yet the taming of all land, sea, air, and undersea [environments](http://www.spacedaily.com/news/milspace-03zh.html" \t "_blank) has invariably included their full exploitation for war. Similarly, the seemingly relentless pursuit of technological advantage is an inherent drive in any willful, sovereign nation. It can therefore be assumed that the comprehensive militarization of space is inevitable. Though the human exploitation of space is still in its infancy, we are at risk of relinquishing our military space dominance to competitors at an early stage. The Dilemma The reasons for our National decline in space engagement are well known, and the case has often been made for reinvigorating U.S. military and civil [space programs](http://www.spacedaily.com/news/milspace-03zh.html" \t "_blank) to correct the atrophy and prepare for future challenges. As a consequence of recommendations from the Commission to Assess National Security Space Management and Organization, the Air Force (AF) has been designated as the Executive Agent (EA) for National Security Space (NSS). This has served as a crucial initial step towards greater NSS unity of effort, leadership, and space advocacy. The results of implementation of the Space Commission's recommendations, with regards to Joint Space Cadre solidification and NSS martial identity, have been wholly successful to date. However, the dilemma for a single Service to simultaneously advocate and fund two environmentally disparate sets of technologies and warfighting responsibilities is becoming increasingly evident. Space-enabled national security contributions are expensive, and threat-based NSS budget requirements will exert increasing pressure on the AF EA in response to increasing capabilities needs. At the same time, the AF determination to execute its traditional roles and missions - as well as modernize - will exert at least equal pressure on the same leadership. There is no doubt that AF leaders understand and appreciate the critical role of that our space supremacy plays in America's security. However, they also understand that when the President tasks a mission to a Combatant Commander he expects that AF weapons delivery on target and other traditional AF missions will be the first Service priority. In consideration of traditional priorities there will understandably be less willingness to resource space capabilities that only indirectly contribute to the AF primary mission, especially when done at the expense of that primary mission. Nor will there be urgent concern for the warfighting opportunities and strategic advantages to be gained in space in the future that require long-term, robust investment in space, when those tangible benefits cannot be perceived now. Therefore, while investment in continued space supremacy is in the nation's best interest, it is not, by itself, in the AF's best interest. The Department of the Air Force budget likely won't keep pace with the two distinctive sets of costly aerospace needs. As a result, the aggravation and competition between the air and space communities within the AF can be expected to become even more severe. Faced with what could amount to zero-sum-gain AF funding constraints, space is likely to suffer first. This dilemma is not the fault of either AF aerospace community. Instead, it lies in a National Security Act and in Title 10 authorizations that are out-of-date. It is also understandable that an Aviation-oriented leadership might tend to appreciate and advance air capabilities over those required for space security. It would be folly to sacrifice the strategic and tactical qualities that maintain our U.S. Air Force as the world's most advanced and capable, but it would be as great a folly to lose or fail to reinforce our nation's tenuous hold on military space superiority. Considering the dilemma, a next step in NSS organization and management may be in order, namely the establishment of a separate, Title 10 empowered Space Service. 20th Century history provides some useful insights relevant to this issue . During the years immediately following the WWI Armistice, U.S. Army General William (Billy) Mitchell strongly advocated the establishment of an Air Force, separate from and outside of the Department of the Army. Military aviation was truly in its infancy at that time, and it was during WWI that General Mitchell had executed the first primitive versions of massed aerial bombardment. As a visionary, he accurately predicted the future potential of strategic air warfare that would become evident some two decades later. But any independent air force concept would have competed with the military tradition and resources of Army and Navy at the time, and his views met the strongest institutional resistance. He was chastised, and the U.S. missed an opportunity to comprehend and preemptively act on the direction that military technology and strategy were moving. Innovations within Naval Aviation and unbridled American aircraft invention and industry allowed us to react to the strategic surprises of the Axis Powers that appeared later. But the victorious outcome was never guaranteed, and it is worth asking what could have been gained by the earlier establishment of an empowered Air Force. Perhaps the U.S. could have fielded a jet powered air superiority fighter of a technology vintage comparable to Messerschmidt 262 or a longer range and more survivable strategic bomber like the B29 much earlier. In the case of these and other opportunities, the war in all theaters could have been brought to an earlier conclusion once America entered WWII. Hindsight is always clearer, and General Mitchell's vision was finally vindicated in 1947 with the establishment of the Title 10 empowered USAF. In the years hence, the existence of a AF has been and remains crucial to our national security, but the lost opportunities prior to and during WWII could not be recovered. A more recent and perhaps equally relevant example involved the accelerated establishment of the Department of Homeland Security. Admittedly, it was already a conceptual entity well on its way to debate and consideration prior to the Global War on Terrorism. However, if some semblance of its fully synchronized organizational functions had been in place years ago when it was first envisioned, perhaps the events preceding Sept 11, 2001 could have been interpreted, and the tragic results prevented. Again, like Billy Mitchell's vision of an Air Force, this assumption can only be made in hindsight, but historical examples and their relevance to current trends can provide us good templates to prepare for the future, in this case, the inevitability of space warfare. If history serves to guide our future preparedness, then NSS should now perhaps consider a military department to guard against surprise from any space-related event that places us at a strategic disadvantage.

1AC Advantage 2 – Hegemony 2/4

### Russia and China have already created Space Forces- American failure to immediately do likewise threatens a Space Pearl Harbor, devastating hegemony

Story, Army Aviation and Space Operations Colonel, Senior Service Fellow @ The University of Texas at Austin’s Institute of Advanced Technology, Center for Studies in Acquisition, 2002 (Kurt S., April 9th, “A Separate Space Force: An Old Debate with Renewed Relevance”, US Army War College, [http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA404193](http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA404193" \t "_blank) )

 The best way to protect space as a center of gravity is through the creation of a separate Space Force dedicated to maintaining the United States' space superiority. The benefits associated with a separate Space Force and the ascendancy of space power clearly outweigh the costs associated with the creation of a new Service. Senator Bob Smith, a strong supporter of a separate Space Force put it very clearly when he stated: A Space Force would put the same muscle behind space missions that the Army, Navy, and Air Force flex in their missions today. A separate service would allow spacepower to compete for funding within the entire defense budget, lessening the somewhat unfair pressure on the Air Force to make most of the tradeoffs, and protecting spacepower programs from being raided by popular more established programs. A separate service would create an incentive for people to develop needed skills to operate in space and a promotion pathway to retain those people. And a separate service would rationalize the division of labor among the services -- consolidate those tasks that require specialized knowledge, such as missilery and space - so that this specialized knowledge could be applied more effectively.42  The increasing reliance on space by the U.S. military and the civil and commercial sectors is undisputed. The 30 September 2001, Quadrennial Defense Review Report highlights the fact that "technological advances create the potential that competitions will develop in space and cyber space" and that "space control - the exploitation of space and the denial of the use of space to adversaries - will become a key objective in future military competition."43 On 25 January 2001, President Vladimar Putin created a new Russian military space force, an independent section of the military, as part of a plan to streamline and modernize Russian armed forces. "The Russian space forces are in charge of space launch pads and a fleet of military satellites that serve spy and communication purposes and tracks the launches of ballistic missiles.44 On 15 January 2002, the Hong Kong Bureau of the China News Agency reported a group of scientists urged the government to accelerate acceptance of a proposal to develop an infrastructure in space and regard developing space territory as a national strategy. The scientists also recommended that China claim access to space as China's "fourth territory."45 In its report, the Space Commission concluded that the U.S. is an attractive candidate for a "space Pearl Harbor, in which a sneak attack against American commercial and military satellites could cripple business and leave the Pentagon blind to foreign troop and ship movements."46 The events of 11 September 2001, which occurred after the release of the Space Commission's report, are an unfortunate example of the unpredictability of the world environment. It took the Air Force forty-four years to evolve from the Army, but technology and threats associated with globalization do not allow the United States the luxury of a continued, lengthy evolution of air power into aerospace power. The United States must mitigate the risk presented by the nation's reliance on space by accelerating the ascendancy of space power. The best way to ensure the ascendancy of U.S. space power is through the creation of a separate Space Force.

1AC Advantage 2 – Hegemony 3/4

### Space Force furthers programs to harden DOD satellites- solves for countermeasures and natural events

Barber, Douglas, and DuMond, Majors in the US Air Force, 2002 (Norman, Richard, John, Sep 6th, “Why Space Should Be a Separate Service”, Joint Forces Staff College, <http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA421657> )

While negation is an important element of space control as it relates to enemy systems, protection is an equally important function for U.S. systems. A separate Space Service will need to develop and deploy advanced military communication satellites with the necessary “bandwidth, protection, survivability, and interoperability” to support future joint warfighting.14 Much of the U.S. military’s space-based communications is carried over commercial systems as the need for greater bandwidth has far outpaced the military’s ability to fund and deploy its own systems to meet capacity requirements.15 The complicating element is that the military as one customer among many, lacks both the funding and the authority to ensure that its commercial providers incorporate defensive measures into the design and deployment of their satellite systems. The lack of civilian asset self-protection is forecast to continue and will remain a key vulnerability for U.S. forces. Presently MILSTAR is the only communication satellite that has shielding against electromagnetic pulses and other space environment threats. A separate Space Service could better develop countermeasures to the growing availability and low cost of jamming technologies. Developments in miniaturization are enabling the creation of micro- and nano-satellites capable of “bird-dogging,” disrupting or destroying U.S. space systems. Because they are so small, such satellites are very difficult to detect and defeat.16 In a similar fashion, miniaturization has enabled the development of lowcost Global Positioning System GPS jammers that could seriously impair the capabilities of U.S. forces that rely on GPS for navigation and weapons delivery.17

### Defensive space measures preserve US satellite security – situational awareness, hardening and relaunch deter Chinese attacks and secures satellites in case of accidents

Putnam, 2009 Maj. United States Air Force - Marine Corps Command and Staff College [Christopher, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA510842&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf Countering the chinese threat to low earth orbit satellites: Building a defensive space strategyOMB No. 0704-0188

China demonstrated their ability to employ an anti-satellite weapon when it destroyed one of its own weather satellites in 2007. While it does not publish a public national military strategy, several Chinese military authors advocate the use of anti-satellite technologies as an asymmetric weapon to counter the superior conventional capabilities of the United States. Towards this aim, China has developed both kinetic and non-kinetic weapons along with associated supporting infrastructure to target United States low Earth orbit satellites. The United States currently has little capability to defend against an attack on its satellites. As an initial step, the Department of Defense established the Operationally Responsive Space program to address emerging threats. The United States should use current, primarily commercial, technologies to increase its Space Situational Awareness, develop flexible and rapid launch platforms, field small satellites, decrease its dependence on space systems, defend against high-altitude nuclear explosions, and execute institutional changes. Done with transparency, these changes should deter China from employing its. anti-satellite weapons. If deterrence fails, these same changes will also enable the United States to rapidly reconstitute its space systems. As a long-term effort to counter the Chinese threat, the United States must work with China to make it an active stakeholder in space activities; collateral damage from anti-satellite weapons would then threaten China and deter them from using anti-satellite weapons. These recommendations will also help protect United States satellites from other adversaries, accidents, and natural phenomena. Conclusion: The United States can use currently available technologies to quickly build deterrence to China's anti-satellite threat to low Earth orbit satellites. These recommendations will also enable the United States to operate its satellites through an attack and rapidly reconstitute its constellations.

1AC Advantage 2 – Hegemony 4/4

### No other country can replace the US – loss of primacy leads to apolarity – causes every impact possible

Edelman, Senior Associate of the International Security Program at Harvard, 10 Understanding America’s Contested Primacy, http://www.csbaonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/2010.10.21-Understanding-Americas-Contested-Supremacy.pdf

All the countries we have considered have strengths and the potential to increase their power, but all of them are also certain to face serious problems. The period of unipolarity has been based on a singular fact: the United States is the first leading state in modern international history with decisive preponderance in all the underlying components of power: economic, military, technological and geopolitical. With the possible exception of Brazil, all the other powers face serious internal and external security challenges. Japan, with its economic and demographic challenges, must deal with a de facto nuclear-armed, failing state (the DPRK) nearby and must also cast an uneasy glance at a rising China. India has domestic violence, insurgencies in bordering countries (Nepal and Bangladesh) and a persistent security dilemma with respect to China. The demographic challenges will be particularly acute for Europe, Japan, and Russia in the areas of military manpower and economic growth. The results will either diminish overall military strength or, in the case of Russia, impose a greater reliance on nuclear weapons. With all of the problems and uncertainties that the emerging economies face and the enormous challenges that bedevil the developed world in Europe and Japan, only one thing seems certain: events will drive international economics and politics in directions that no one now anticipates and the certainties about rising and falling powers are likely to be knocked askew by a fickle and unpredictable fate. As global wealth and power flow to Asia, even if it does not occur as quickly and completely as some boosters maintain, America’s margin of superiority will decline to some degree. Whether the international system moves toward a multipolar world, as forecast by *Global Trends 2025*, however, will depend to a large degree on how people perceive the relative shifts in power and how they choose to act on those perceptions. America’s geographic position is fixed and has been a persistent source of strength. As Samuel Huntington has noted, US power “flows from its structural position in world politics ... geographically distant from most major areas of world conflict” as well as from “being involved in a historically uniquely diversified network of alliances.” Natural resources are another area of enduring advantage for the United States. America’s farmers and producers have never been more efficient or productive than they are today. Agriculture has been “a bastion of American competitiveness.” Energy resources are another advantage. The media have lavished a great deal of attention on the United States’ dependency on imported oil, a true strategic liability, but they have neglected coal and gas resources. In fact, the United States (combined with Canada) trails only the Middle East in the wealth of its energy resources. Industrial capacity is an area where the decline of the US manufacturing sector has been seen as a surrogate for broader US decline. The United States’ transition to a post-industrial, information-technologyoriented and heavily financialized economy was an important part of avoiding the predictions of “imperial overstretch” in the 1990s. In the wake of the Great Recession the post-industrial transition is seen as perhaps an Achilles’ heel of the US economy. These views probably underestimate a few factors that should help the United States navigate the current transition from the first unipolar era to whatever follows it. Openness to innovation can play an important role in extending the United States’ leading role in the world. Some scholars believe that innovation is the key to countries emerging as system leaders in sectors that power long waves of economic activity and growth. Failure to maintain system leadership in these sectors is a key cause of decline. Another factor that may propel the United States to a more rapid recovery is the so-called “American creed,” which includes a very heavy dose of hostility to the role of the state in the economy. A larger private sector may well continue to provide entrepreneurs and innovators the scope to prolong America’s leading sector primacy in the international economy.An additional, and extremely important, long-term factor underpinning likely continued US global economic leadership is demographics. The US fertility rates are among the highest in the developed world and are virtually at replacement. With a growing population that will be more youthful than other developed countries (or China) the United States would appear to be in a favorable position. One could also add to the long list of US advantages the political and social stability that has made it the safe haven for global investors. None of these advantages, however, including the United States’ military power, mean that the United States is destined to remain the preponderant power or that unipolarity will continue to characterize the international system indefinitely. Bad policy decisions in a number of areas could negate or squander US advantages. In addition the United States faces many of its own challenges. Despite its demographic health the United States will have to meet the unfunded pension liabilities represented by the aging of the baby boom generation. The nation’s standing has also suffered from the mismanagement of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Without a concerted effort by the United States, the international system could move in the direction of nonpolarity or apolarity with no nation clearly playing a leading role in trying to organize the international system. The result would be a vacuum of leadership unable to manage the plethora of contemporary problems besetting the world like terrorism, nuclear proliferation, ethnic and sectarians wars, humanitarian disasters, crime, narcotics trafficking, pandemic disease and global climate change to name just a few.

## Inherency – No Space Supremacy Now

### Any perceived vulnerability in our space program will be exploited in order to challenge U.S. security

Gates & Clapper ’11 (Robert M: Secretary of Defense; James R.: Director of National Intelligence, “National Security Space Strategy: Unclassified Summary,” January 2011. < http://www.espi.or.at/images/stories/dokumente/diverse/NationalSecuritySpaceStrategyUnclassifNationalSe\_Jan2011.pdf> LV)

Space is increasingly contested in all orbits. Today space systems and their supporting infrastructure face a range of man-made threats that may deny, degrade, deceive, disrupt, or destroy assets. Potential adversaries are seeking to exploit perceived space vulnerabilities. As more nations and non-state actors develop counterspace capabilities over the next decade, threats to U.S. space systems and challenges to the stability and security of the space environment will increase. Irresponsible acts against space systems could have implications beyond the space domain, disrupting worldwide services upon which the civil and commercial sectors depend.

## Link – Space Force Solves Weaponization 1/2

### Weapons developed by the Space Force would be best – they are less detectable, more effective, and cost less than those the plan would develop

Barber, Douglas, and DuMond, Majors in the US Air Force, 2002 (Norman, Richard, John, Sep 6th, “Why Space Should Be a Separate Service”, Joint Forces Staff College, <http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA421657> )

Plans to employ a number of innovative space systems in the future require a separate Space Service to integrate targeting priorities with a global perspective. U.S. planners are also working on a distributed surveillance satellite constellation carrying weather, radar, optical, and hyperspectral sensors. A key element of such enhanced surveillance capability may involve space-based synthetic aperture radars (SAR). Planners foresee deploying a small constellation of SAR satellites in low earth orbit with an imaging capability refined to 1-centimeter resolution.21 The development of Force Application assets like the “micro-munitions” using “coordinate targeting”22 would give the United States a truly revolutionary over-the-horizon weapon system. These barely detectable weapons would combine the precision navigation capability of the next generation GPS with the superhigh-resolution imagery of a space-based SAR system. Thus instead of relying on a 2,000-pound bomb to eliminate an adversary’s command and control center, the United States could launch a baseball-sized munition to destroy its antenna array, achieving the same effect at a fraction of the cost.

### Space Force solves weaponization – it should take responsibility over ASAT’s and negation assets

Barber, Douglas, and DuMond, Majors in the US Air Force, 2002 (Norman, Richard, John, Sep 6th, “Why Space Should Be a Separate Service”, Joint Forces Staff College, <http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA421657> )

Today, USSPACECOM is responsible for development of space capabilities. A separate Space Service, taking the lead in all future enhancements to space-based enabling technologies and applications, should control that responsibility. Space related hardware generally falls into two broad categories. The first is systems dedicated to Space Control and the other is systems used in Space Support. According to General Ralph E. Eberhardt, commander of USSPACECOM, “Space control involves ensuring the United States’ use of space while denying its use to the enemy.”10 From his perspective, the growing reliance of the military, intelligence agencies, and commercial interests on space-based systems makes it imperative that the United States place more emphasis and resources on ensuring positive control of space. A separate Space Service would enjoy organizational parity with the other Services, thereby ensuring that it received the attention and funding it deserves. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty is an important influence on the types of systems a separate Space Service could deploy. That agreement prohibits the deployment of space-based weapons of mass destruction, be they nuclear, biological or chemical. However, it does not restrict the use of conventional weapons.11 In compliance with the treaty provisions, the United States is developing antisatellite systems using either kinetic energy (KE-ASAT), or directed energy.12 KE-ASAT capability relies on a “killer satellite” that maneuvers to hit a target satellite, or detonates itself in the path of a satellite, destroying the target as it flies through the resultant debris field. A directed energy antisatellite system, using laser or microwave energy, could be deployed aboard a satellite, an aircraft, or ground station. Such a weapon would render target satellites inoperative by damaging critical command, communication, or navigation components. Whether kinetic or directed energy, such Force Application weapons would play an important role in Space Control by negating an adversary’s use of space systems. A separate Space Service also is needed to develop other negation assets. Other ways to accomplish negation are to jam the signal links between satellites and their ground stations, or to “spoof” the satellites, causing them to transmit erroneous information. Yet another method is to employ a laser dazzler to temporarily blind a satellite. The United States is currently working to develop these capabilities through both space- and ground-based systems.13 While negation is an important element of space control as it relates to enemy systems, protection is an equally important function for U.S. systems.

Link – Space Force Solves Weaponization 2/2

### Only a Space Force can secure adequate funding and attention for weaponization to prevent adversaries from surpassing us

Gayl, Deputy Head of the Space and IO Integration Branch, Science Advisor to the Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations, 2003 (Franz J., Nov 17th, “The Military Space Service: Why It's Time Has Come”, Space Daily, [http://www.spacedaily.com/news/milspace-03zh.html](http://www.spacedaily.com/news/milspace-03zh.html" \t "_blank))

 The future of U.S. supremacy in space is in jeopardy. New entrants to [space exploration](http://www.spacedaily.com/news/milspace-03zh.html" \t "_blank), rich in both intellectual capital and superpower ambitions, are pressing irresistibly forward. These include formidable past competitors, such as China and Russia, as well as India, Japan, Europe, and others. If the stakes were only related to commercial advantage or national [scientific](http://www.spacedaily.com/news/milspace-03zh.html" \t "_blank) pride these independent initiatives would be welcome in the spirit of peaceful globalization. Yet the taming of all land, sea, air, and undersea [environments](http://www.spacedaily.com/news/milspace-03zh.html" \t "_blank) has invariably included their full exploitation for war. Similarly, the seemingly relentless pursuit of technological advantage is an inherent drive in any willful, sovereign nation. 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If history serves to guide our future preparedness, then NSS should now perhaps consider a military department to guard against surprise from any space-related event that places us at a strategic disadvantage

## China Adv – China is a Threat

### Chinese capabilities and intentions prove they pursue asymmetric warfare -– this is based on readings of Chinese doctrine and law. China exploits international law for their advantage.

Bellflower 2010, instructor at the Advanced Space Operations School [Air Force Judge Advocate General School. The Air Force Law Review. The influence of law on command of space name: major john w. Bellflower Lexis Accessed June 21, 2011]

The lack of transparency in China's military and security affairs poses risks to stability by increasing the potential for misunderstanding and miscalculation. This situation will naturally and understandably lead to hedging against the unknown. 149 Potential adversaries, such as China, may also employ strategic lawfare to limit U.S. command of space. Recognizing its current technological inferiority in space as compared to the United States, China has focused its military efforts on "developing capabilities that target potential vulnerabilities of the United States." 150 This is particularly the case with American dependence on space assets, something China views as America's "soft ribs and strategic weakness." 151 Aware that military options are not a viable choice at this time given the financial, military, and technological gap between it and America, China is beginning to use international law as a means of countering American space power, in part to buy itself time to develop capabilities to take advantage of America's space vulnerabilities. 152 To justify its future military actions in space, China is continually developing doctrine and legal justifications to garner support within the international community. 153 It has, in essence, taken Machiavelli's advice 154 and not only sought to achieve its military objectives through resort to law, but also to legitimize its military actions in case resort to military means become necessary. A. Chinese Lawfare The Chinese view space as an essential arena for future warfare. 155 Rather than attempt to achieve parity and directly compete with U.S. space capabilities, China appears focused on an asymmetric strategy "to deny its opponent use of [space] as much as possible." 156 Thus, China is pursuing means to inhibit American freedom of action in [\*134] space through the development of capabilities to destroy, damage, and interfere with American satellite systems in an effort to blind and deafen the U.S. military in the event of conflict. 157 Complementing its increase in military capabilities, China has embraced asymmetric warfare at a level previously unimagined. 158 Chinese doctrine views warfare as not only "a military struggle, but also a comprehensive contest on fronts of politics, economy, diplomacy, and law." 159 Thus, China appears to eschew the tactical use of lawfare in favor of its strategic use as an "active defense" to be employed in advance of actual conflict and across the spectrum of human activity. 160 The Chinese formulation of full-spectrum warfare is contained in the concept of "Three Warfares" that combines and incorporates psychological, media, and legal components into a coordinated strategy. 161 The legal component describes "the use of international and domestic laws to gain international support and manage possible political repercussions of China's military actions" 162 and advocates seizing "the earliest opportunity to set up regulations." 163 Further, Chinese military doctrine closely intertwines public opinion warfare--media and psychological warfare--and lawfare. Media warfare seeks to manipulate the news media to achieve a propaganda victory and break an enemy's will to fight. 164 Psychological warfare employs the use of "selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups and individuals . . . to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to [China]." 165 Thus, China blends lawfare and public opinion warfare in order to achieve international legitimacy for its actions. 166 This strategy [\*135] finds current expression in China's actions regarding the sea--a use of lawfare that has enormous implications for its projected activities in the space domain.

## China Adv – Plan Solves Weaponization

### China is ramping up space acquisitions to counter U.S. conventional superiority – They will attack our space systems to cripple U.S. hegemony

Adams, Major in the USAF at Air Force Space Command, 2K5 (Richard, “The Chinese Threat to US Space Superiority,” High Frontier: The Journal for Space and Missile Professionals, Winter, Volume 1, Number 3)

In the event of a future Sino-American conflict, it is likely China intends to exploit the vulnerability of US space systems. Two key factors motivate Beijing to develop, deploy, and employ counterspace capabilities. The first is the need to neutralize the overwhelming conventional military advantage America currently derives from its space assets. In particular, China fears that American technical dominance encourages Taiwanese defiance and emboldens the US to intervene militarily in a future crisis. Second, the Chinese desire to bolster the viability of their nuclear deterrent by securing the means to threaten a space-reliant US anti-ballistic missile (ABM) network. Both objectives are driving China to evolve its military doctrine and expand its technical ability to function against a high-tech, information-hungry enemy. Beijing has closely followed the technology-driven revolution in US military affairs that, to a great extent, depends on spaceborne assets. The conventional military prowess demonstrated by the American military in recent operations seized the attention of Chinese strategists who view the space-networked nature of this new American way of war as a potential weakness. As a result, the Peopleʼs Liberation Army (PLA) is developing new doctrine, based on surprise and information systems attack, to counter a threat it sees to its own strategic position. The dramatic space- and information-fueled success of US military operations over the past 15 years profoundly impacted Chinese military thinking. The decisiveness with which the US dismantled the Iraqi army in the 1991 Gulf War shocked Beijing and highlighted the vulnerability of Chinaʼs technologically inferior forces.5 Operations DESERT STORM and ALLIED FORCE led the Peopleʼs Republic of China (PRC) to develop a new Three Attacks and Three Defenses strategy emphasizing denial of enemy precision strike, electronic warfare, and reconnaissance capabilities—all dependent to some degree on space systems.6 The introduction of Global Positioning System (GPS)-guided munitions in ALLIED FORCE heightened the PLAʼs consciousness of the critical role of space control in US warfighting.7 China witnessed yet another quantum jump in American exploitation of space-based communications, navigation, and ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) in Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM. The conduct of these operations increasingly leads Chinese strategists to focus on US Forcesʼ dependence on space, as evidenced by several recent studies. A 1994 report by Chinaʼs Academy of Military Science (AMS) emphasized the American military appetite for satellite services, noting 70 percent of all US military communications and 90 percent of all military intelligence flows through spaceborne systems.8 A 1997 paper by Chinaʼs Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry (COSTIND) characterized US military exploitation of space-based systems as a potential Achillesʼ Heel. In 2000, a report from Xinhua, a state news agency of the PRC, described US over reliance on technology and space as part of “The US Militaryʼs Soft Ribs and Strategic Weakness.” The report went on to state, “For countries that can never win a war with the United States by using the method of tanks and planes, attacking the US space system may be an irresistible and most tempting choice. Part of the reason is that the Pentagon is greatly dependent on space for its military action.”9 Open source Chinese publications reflect Beijingʼs increased interest in spaceborne targets. In a 1995 meeting, members of Chinaʼs Central Military Commission (CMC) listed an adversaryʼs “nervous system and brain” as essential objectives in modern warfare.10 In a 1998 article, Captain Shen Zhongchang, Director of Research and Development at the Navy Research Institute in Beijing, described “mastery of outer space” as a precondition for victory in future battles.11 In 1999, the Vice Minister of COSTIND stated, “Since GPS is playing an ever-increasing role in long-range precision attacks, precision bombing, accurate deployment of troops, requests for reinforcements and unified actions for command and control, anti-satellite systems centered on satellite navigation will be developed...”12 It is apparent Chinese strategists have identified American space systems as a Center of Gravity and seek to degrade this asymmetric advantage through development of counterspace means. Beijing’s evolving military strategy could dramatically shape the conduct of a future Sino-American clash in Asia. In particular, PLA planning revolves principally around a potential conflict with the US over Taiwan. The islandʼs political separation from the mainland is currently the most pressing challenge to Chinese sovereignty. Beijing, in fact, considers national unity a fundamental requirement for Chinaʼs survival as a nation.13 The PRC has enumerated a number of triggers that would lead to a military response in the Taiwan Strait: a Taiwanese declaration of independence; internal instability in Taiwan; foreign intrusion into Taiwanese security affairs; and Taiwanʼs possession of a nuclear weapon.14 China has also stated it may impose a forceful resolution to the Taiwan question if “progress” toward reunification stalls.15 The keys to any Chinese military action against Taiwan would first be deterrence of US intervention and then, if an attack is initiated, limiting Americaʼs capacity and will to respond. If China elects to use military measures to secure national unity, its primary goal will be to achieve a quick outcome through surprise, speed, and deception.16 America’s space-dependent information infrastructure presents an alluring target, making a non-lethal strike against US space assets a likely precursor or adjunct to an attack.

## Hegemony Adv – Plan Solves Hegemony

### Space Force causes the development of a US space plane- force application and rapid response missions maintain space dominance

Barber, Douglas, and DuMond, Majors in the US Air Force, 2002 (Norman, Richard, John, Sep 6th, “Why Space Should Be a Separate Service”, Joint Forces Staff College, <http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA421657> )

Another reason for a separate Space Service is the need to develop the piloted singlestage- to-orbit space-plane that has consistently been placed on the back burner by the Air Force. The space-plane would support Space Control, Space Support, and the Force Application missions. The key factor in the deployment of both Space Control and Space Support systems is the enormous cost of putting satellites into orbit. The United States relies primarily on expensive single-use rockets to fulfill that task and developed the Space Shuttle program as an economical, reusable space lift capability. Unfortunately, the savings promised by the shuttle program were never realized. The space-plane would fulfill the original goal of the space shuttle program by providing a more cost effective way to deliver space systems into orbit. Force Application and the goals of Rapid Decisive Operations would also benefit from a space-plane and its ability to project small, lethal “strike teams” to crisis areas anywhere in the world, in hours rather than days. Overall, the space-plane contributions are a logical and necessary addition, which only a separate Space Service could guide to maturity. For all the advances the United States has realized in the development of space-based technologies, many experts are coming to realize that the continued management of space control and space support is outside the ability of the U.S. military’s current organizational structure. Furthermore, to maintain dominance in space, the United States must anticipate future threats and exploit the capabilities of commercial industries. Only a separate Space Service can adequately perform that critical function while harnessing new technologies and the revolutionary capabilities they offer.

### Space Force would better develop countermeasures to weaponization by other nations- solves arms race and hegemony

Barber, Douglas, and DuMond, Majors in the US Air Force, 2002 (Norman, Richard, John, Sep 6th, “Why Space Should Be a Separate Service”, Joint Forces Staff College, <http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA421657> )

A separate Space Service could better develop countermeasures to the growing availability and low cost of jamming technologies. Developments in miniaturization are enabling the creation of micro- and nano-satellites capable of “bird-dogging,” disrupting or destroying U.S. space systems. Because they are so small, such satellites are very difficult to detect and defeat.16 In a similar fashion, miniaturization has enabled the development of lowcost Global Positioning System (GPS) jammers that could seriously impair the capabilities of U.S. forces that rely on GPS for navigation and weapons delivery.17

## Solvency – Quick Timeframe

### A Space Force could be developed quickly- personnel and funding are already available

Barber, Douglas, and DuMond, Majors in the US Air Force, 2002 (Norman, Richard, John, Sep 6th, “Why Space Should Be a Separate Service”, Joint Forces Staff College, <http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA421657> )

The necessary assets for a separate Space Service are available today. The DOD could quickly and efficiently establish a separate Space Service by staffing it with the present USSPACECOM, USSTRATCOM, Air Force, Navy, and Army Space Command personnel and budget. It seems reasonable that NASA should also be integrated into the Space Service in a manner similar to the way the Coast Guard and Marine Corps are part of the Department of Transportation and the Navy respectively. A separate Space Service would be responsible for supporting and defending national military objectives and civilian assets just as the Navy and Coast Guard operate today in their maritime medium. Space Force Application will develop economically, Enhancement for the entire joint force will increase, Space Lift will finally be supported by an economical platform, and a staff, led by foundationally solid leadership, will provide the vision for the Space Service of the future.

### Timeframe is irrelevant- the need for a Space Force means it is only a question of when it must be developed, the plan eliminates the chances of it beginning

Barber, Douglas, and DuMond, Majors in the US Air Force, 2002 (Norman, Richard, John, Sep 6th, “Why Space Should Be a Separate Service”, Joint Forces Staff College, <http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA421657>)

Congressman Dan Daniel’s comments with regard to creating a Special Operations Service echo the call to create a separate Space Service. He notes, “At one time or another, the tank, the airplane and many other ways of war were viewed with skepticism and distaste before they were absorbed into the military’s philosophical core.”30 Space-based weapons are meeting these same challenges today, but the precedent of the Air Force’s secession from the Army should facilitate a Space Service’s establishment. Doctrinal, technological and organizational issues call for space’s equality with the sister Services in order to support the military instrument of power. One can only hope the nation’s leadership will overcome Service rivalry and do what is required to exploit space force effects globally in the most economic manner. Overall, Space Vision 2020 makes it clear: “During the early portion of the 21st Century, space power will also evolve into a separate and equal medium of warfare.” The question is now left in the leadership’s hands to decide when the separate Space Service will begin.

### Waiting until later to develop a Space Force means we won’t act until space war breaks out and it’s too late- your argument is suicidal

Story, Army Aviation and Space Operations Colonel, Senior Service Fellow @ The University of Texas at Austin’s Institute of Advanced Technology, Center for Studies in Acquisition, 2002 (Kurt S., April 9th, “A Separate Space Force: An Old Debate with Renewed Relevance”, US Army War College, [http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA404193](http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA404193" \t "_blank) )

 It is not convincing that historical precedence is a valid criterion for arguing against the creation of a separate Space Force. The Air Force's historical precedent and model of evolutionary growth and reorganization does not necessarily lend itself to the technology driven, rapidly increasing threats in the global environment. As previously mentioned, the Air Force evolved over a 44-year period. By comparison, the development of space power is significantly behind that of air power at the 44-year mark. Could it be that the current organizational model is a main contributor to the slow development in space doctrine, limited advocacy for a space budget, and the development of space professionals, all of which are linked? It is simply ridiculous to wait for a war to prove the effectiveness of and to certify the need for a separate Space Force.

## Solvency – Arms Race

### U.S. space militarization prevents space arms race- spurs scientific development, and deters potential rivals

Dolman 2005, Associate Professor of Comparative Military Studies at the US Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies [Everett C. Dolman. “US Military Transformation and Weapons.” September 14, 2005. <http://www.e-parl.net/pages/space_hearing_images/ConfPaper%20Dolman%20US%20Military%20Transform%20%26%20Space.pdf>. Accessed June 24, 2011.]

Seizing the initiative and securing low-Earth orbit now, while the US is unchallenged in space, would do much to stabilize the international system and prevent an arms race is space. From low-Earth orbit (LEO), the enhanced ability to deny any attempt by another nation to place military assets in space, or to readily engage and destroy terrestrial ASAT capacity, makes the possibility of large scale space war and or military space races less likely, not more. Why would a state expend the effort to compete in space with a superpower that has the extraordinary advantage of holding securely the highest ground at the top of the gravity well? So long as the controlling state demonstrates a capacity and a will to use force to defend its position, in effect expending a small amount of violence as needed to prevent a greater conflagration in the future, the likelihood of a future war in space is remote. Moreover, if the US were willing to deploy and use a military space force that maintained effective control of space, and did so in a way that was perceived as tough, non-arbitrary, and efficient, such an action would serve to discourage competing states from fielding opposing systems. Should the US use its advantage to police the heavens (assuming the entire cost on its own), and allow unhindered peaceful use of space by any and all nations for economic and scientific development, over time its control of LEO could be viewed as a global asset and a public good. Much in the manner that the British maintained control of the high seas, enforcing international norms of innocent passage and property rights , the US could prepare outer space for a long-overdue burst of economic expansion.

## 2AC Space Treaty Counterplan 1/2

### Permutation – do both – even if we develop space agreements, we need to develop weapons, in case negotiations fail, because conflict is inevitable

Hyten 2001 Director, Space Programs, Office of the Ass Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, [4 January 01. Air & Space Power Journal . A Sea of Peace or a Theater of War: Dealing with the Inevitable Conflict in Space. Lt Col John E. Hyten. http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/Hyten.html]

The United States has an amazing opportunity to implement a vision that will help shape the world in the 21st century. Space is only one of many places where this opportunity presents itself, but space is unique in many ways. Space envelops the earth and reaches to the stars. Space has the ability to effect, in some way, every person’s life on this planet. Without a peer competitor, the United States has the opportunity now to take advantage of the unique attributes of space, but the nation has not yet stepped up to the challenge. Conflict in space is inevitable. No frontier exploited or occupied by humans has ever been free from conflict, but the United States has a remarkable chance to mold and shape how these conflicts will be resolved in the future. There is no threat right now that demands the deployment of space weapons. Opportunities exist in the Conference on Disarmament and through bilateral negotiations to make progress in eliminating the future need for such weapons. At the same time the United States cannot afford to be caught off guard in the future—the nation cannot afford to be second in the deployment of space weapons. The only way to ensure this happens is through a robust development program for an entire spectrum of space control capabilities—deferring the decision to deploy space weapons until a clear requirement exists. If the United States remains strong, if space truly is a clear vital national interest, if we negotiate openly with the nations of the world, if we allow our industry to fully exploit space and become the unquestioned leader of the information age, and if we develop the means and methods to effectively deal with the inevitable conflicts that will occur in space in the next century, perhaps President Kennedy’s new ocean could remain primarily a "sea of peace." If, however, the United States continues without an integrated national strategy, if we fail to define a vision of space for the future, if we decide to develop space weapons in a vacuum apart from the rest of the space community, if we refuse to negotiate with other nations, or if we fail to fully establish a comprehensive commercial space policy, then the ocean will undoubtedly become "a terrifying new theater of war."

### China uses space arms control as a cover to buy time to attack the U.S.

Wortzel, Vice President for Foreign Policy and Defense Studies at the Heritage Foundation, 10-15-2K3 (Larry, “China and the Battlefield in Space,” WebMemo #346, http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/wm346.cfm)

The newest battlefield for China will be in space. From a defensive standpoint China is seeking to block the United States from developing its own anti-satellite weapons and space-based ballistic missile defense systems. Beijing and Moscow, through diplomatic channels, have introduced a draft United Nations Treaty that would ban conventional and non-nuclear weapons in space.[i] Meanwhile, from an offensive standpoint, China is developing its own weapons. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is experimenting with directed energy weapons that can kill satellites and in theoretical research is considering particle beam weapons that can engage missiles in flight. [ii] The Chinese military is also considering the use of “piggy-back satellites” and “micro-satellites” that can be used as kinetic energy weapons to destroy enemy satellites or spacecraft, or can attach themselves to enemy satellites to jam them.[iii] The Chinese security establishment has a sophisticated understanding of the way that the United States envisions the use of space in the future.[iv] The United States, in the view of the scientific and defense establishment of China is likely to incorporate hand-held wireless technology for all military communications into its future command and control systems along with space-based laser intercept weapons and a new generation of Global Positioning System satellites. Beijing’s strategy to confront the United States in this area is clear: work on public opinion in the United States to make moral arguments against weapons in space, develop international coalitions to limit the way that the United States can use space, and develop China’s own weapons systems and tactics to destroy American satellites and space-based weapons.[v]

2AC Space Treaty Counterplan 2/2

### Plan doesn’t violate space law – militarization is legally justified in the name of self defense

Bellflower 2010, instructor at the Advanced Space Operations School [Air Force Judge Advocate General School. The Air Force Law Review. The influence of law on command of space name: major john w. Bellflower Lexis Accessed June 21, 2011]

Despite its firm commitment to freedom of access to space as recognized by the Outer Space Treaty, the United States understands the potential vulnerability of space systems from both natural and man-made sources. 113 Irrespective of the freedom of access principle, prudence mandates the understanding that some may attempt to interfere with the right of access to space. If not previously concluded from decades of competition among the several nations with space capabilities, certainly the Chinese test of a direct-ascent anti-satellite weapons system in January of 2007 starkly demonstrates that space is now a contested domain. 114 Recognizing the truth stated by Thomas Hobbes, that "covenants, without the sword, are words and of no strength to secure man," 115 there is a need to "cooperate with our allies and the private sector to identify and protect against intentional and unintentional threats to U.S. and allied space capabilities." 116 The ability to protect this right of access is embraced within the concept of negative command of space. b. Negative Command The capability to exercise negative command of space does not violate any international law. Although command of space embraces the ability to deny another state's access to space, analysis of the legality of any such action depends on the actor's intent not with the capability itself. In that respect, the declared and apparent U.S. intent is incontrovertibly one of self defense, in support of the legitimate objective of maintaining its legal right to continued and assured access. 117 [\*127] Over 200 years ago, Chief Justice Marshall opined that "the authority of a nation within its own territory is absolute and exclusive. . . . But its power to secure itself from injury may certainly be exercised beyond the limits of its territory." 118 This principle was later reiterated by former Secretary of State Elihu Root when he discussed the "right of self protection" as "a right recognized by international law" in stating: "[t]he right is a necessary corollary of independent sovereignty. It is well understood that the exercise of the right of self-protection may and frequently does extend its effect beyond the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of the State exercising it." 119 Articles III and IV of the Outer Space Treaty, when read in conjunction, authorize self-defense in space. 120

## 2AC Spending Disadvantage

### A Space Force maximizes efficiency and savings by streamlining spending and command structures

Story, Army Aviation and Space Operations Colonel, Senior Service Fellow @ The University of Texas at Austin’s Institute of Advanced Technology, Center for Studies in Acquisition, 2002 (Kurt S., April 9th, “A Separate Space Force: An Old Debate with Renewed Relevance”, US Army War College, [http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA404193](http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA404193" \t "_blank) )

 With regard to the overhead costs associated with this bold reorganization effort, there would most certainly be extensive initial costs. Overall, however, the space budget would be better maximized through the close cooperation of military, civil, and commercial space practitioners, the end result being long term efficiency and savings. Additionally, the consolidation of existing functions and commands within one service supports the unity of command principal of war.

### A unified space force is the only way to cut costs by boosting efficiency

Story, Army Aviation and Space Operations Colonel, Senior Service Fellow @ The University of Texas at Austin’s Institute of Advanced Technology, Center for Studies in Acquisition, 2002 (Kurt S., April 9th, “A Separate Space Force: An Old Debate with Renewed Relevance”, US Army War College, [http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA404193](http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA404193" \t "_blank) )

 Figure 432 depicts the roles and responsibilities of White House, Congressional, government agencies, Department of Defense (DoD), and information operations organizations in the conduct of policy formulation, implementation, planning and resource allocation, requirement determination, development and procurement, and operation of national security space capabilities at the time the space commission convened.33 One doesn't have to analyze Figure 4 for long to imagine the many organizational challenges and issues that hamper our nation's efficient acquisition and effective employment of space assets. Space programs currently represent $8 billion of the Pentagon's $300 billion plus budget and are splintered among a "hodgepodge" of Pentagon offices.34 In times of shrinking budget, organizational effectiveness is more critical than ever. Given the relatively small portion of the Pentagon's budget dedicated to space, and the increasing role and importance of space to our national security efforts, it is evident that space dollars must be maximized through leadership, management, organizational design, and efficiency. While the Space Commission stopped short of calling for the near term creation of a military department dedicated to space, it did recognize significant shortcomings in the current organization and management of space assets. The Commission established that: The Department of Defense requires space systems that can be employed in independent operations or in support of air, land and sea forces to deter and defend against hostile actions directed at the interest of the United States. In the mid term a Space Corps within the Air Force may be appropriate to meet this requirement; in the longer term it may be met by a military department for space. In the nearer term, a realigned, rechartered Air Force is best suited to organize, train and equip space forces.35 Essentially, there is a clear parallel between the Space Commission's conclusion that there will be a need for a separate space service and the evolutionary reorganization of the Army Air Corps into the US Air Force. After World War I, air power advocates wanted Congress to create an independent Air Force; however, senior Army leaders were able to convince Congress that the formation of an independent Air Service was premature. In 1926, Congress reorganized the Army, moving aviators from the Signal Corps into their own separate branch, the Air Corps. During World War II, the evolution continued, and in 1942 another organizational change created an independent Army Air Force headquarters within the Army. Finally, in 1947, following the war, Congress made the U.S. Air Force a separate service.36 In other words, a clear precedent has been set. The short term, mid term, and long term recommendations of the Space Commission mirror the evolution and reorganization of the Army Air Corps into the Air Force. Retired General Charles A. Horner, a fighter pilot, commander of coalition air forces during Operation Desert Storm, and former Commander of United States Space Command (CINCSPACE), was a member of the Space Commission. It is interesting to note that in 1997, General Horner went on the record stating: "If the Air Force clings to its ownership of space, then tradeoffs will be made between air and space, when in fact the tradeoff should be made elsewhere."37 While General Homer made his statement based primarily on budgetary considerations, it none the less highlighted his concerns about the future of space power within the Air Force.38

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## 1NC China Advantage 1/2

### Turn - US space military dominance undermines China’s nuclear deterrent – this cause them to modernize their nuclear arsenal

Hui 07 Research associate at Harvard University [Zhang, Space Weaponization And Space Security: A Chinese Perspective Accessed June 24

Moreover, China is concerned that putting weapons in space would constrain its civilian and commercial space activities. China sees itself as a developing economic space power, dependent on free access to space for financial gain. However, U.S. driven space weaponization directly threatens this access. Due to the threatening nature of space weapons, it is reasonable to assume that China and others would attempt to block their deployment and use by political and, if necessary, military means.11 Many Chinese officials and scholars believe that China should take every possible step to maintain the effectiveness of its nuclear deterrent. This includes negating the threats from missile defense and space weaponization plans.12 In responding to any U.S. move toward deployment space weapons, the first and best option for China is to pursue an arms control agreement to prevent not just the United States but any nation from doing so – as it is advocating presently. However, if this effort fails and if what China perceives as its legitimate security concerns are ignored, it would very likely develop responses to counter and neutralize such a threat. Despite the enormous cost of space-based weapon systems, they are vulnerable to a number of low-cost and relatively low-technology ASAT attacks including the use of ground-launched small kinetic-kill vehicles, pellet clouds or space mines. It is reasonable to believe that China and others could resort to these ASAT weapons to counter any U.S. space-based weapons.13 This, however, would lead to an arms race in space. To protect against the potential loss of its deterrent capability, China could potentially resort to enhancing its nuclear forces. Such a move could, in turn, encourage India and then Pakistan to follow suit. Furthermore, Russia has threatened to respond to any country’s deployment of space weapons.14 Moreover, constructing additional weapons would produce a need for more plutonium and highly enriched uranium to fuel those weapons. This impacts China’s participation in the fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT).15 Eventually, failure to proceed with the nuclear disarmament process, to which the nuclear weapon states committed themselves under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, would damage the entire nuclear nonproliferation regime itself, which is already at the breaking point. As Hu Xiaodi, China’s ambassador for disarmament affairs, asked, “With lethal weapons flying overhead in orbit and disrupting global strategic stability, why should people eliminate weapons of mass destruction or missiles on the ground? This cannot but do harm to global peace, security and stability, and hence be detrimental to the fundamental interests of all States.”16

### China will not seek space dominance – only minimal deterrence – they are focused on economic and demographic change

MacDonald 2008 – Council on Foreign Relations [Bruce, Council Special Report No. 38 September China, Space Weapons, date accessed : June 24th, 2011, http://www.cfr.org/china/china-space-weapons-us-security/p16707]

In the long run, if China sustains its economic growth to a point where its economic and technological prowess is roughly comparable to at least Japan’s, if not the United States’, U.S. offensive counterspace superiority could be more difficult to sustain if China decided it wanted parity or more, a distinct possibility. Yet by that time, China would be struggling with the economic and political impact of its demographics, where its one-child policy will lead to a rapidly aging workforce. Chinese leaders require decades of external stability so that they “can continue to focus their attention on economic growth and political reform. China can ill afford external distractions that would absorb resources and jeopardize the environment that China requires for continued economic growth.”20 China has many other looming sociopolitical issues, too, making space force parity likely a lower priority for it, as long as it could maintain space deterrence. If the United States and China can successfully navigate the shoals of uncertainty over the next two or three decades and achieve friendlier relations, such considerations could shrink greatly in significance. But achieving such a state requires that these issues be discussed and debated, with as much information as can safely be made public. As a former Air Force vice chief of staff recently wrote, “It is important to encourage a debate on space power to include development of a space deterrent theory. We need something similar to the intellectual ferment that surrounded nuclear deterrence.”21

1NC China Advantage 2/2

### Creating a separate service undermines integration of new technologies

Barry, Major General in the US Air Force, 2K (John, “AEROSPACE INTEGRATION, NOT SEPARATION,” Aerospace Power Journal, Summer, Volume 14, Issue 2)

Designers of tomorrow's aerospace force must mix evolving technologies. They must keep one eye on marginal advantage and the other on time phasing. Stealth, propulsion, sensors, bandwidth, precision munitions, materials, range, C2, interoperability, electronic warfare, information warfare, directed energy, infrared spectrum, and simulation are but a few of the changing technologies incorporated in practically every aerospace system. With each technology advancing at a different rate, their integration is an immense task. This integration is difficult when managed by a single service. It would be even more difficult if subjected to the "roles-and-missions" frictions inherent when separate military services work the same task. Understandably, no one mix of systems will ever satisfy advocates of each individual component. Whenever we prioritize, someone inevitably gets the lowest priority--and advocates for that system predictably complain. Nonetheless, history shows that a singular leader dedicated to the success of the overall operation can best translate multiple advancing technologies into an overall system of systems. Because air and space systems work together for mutual benefit and because air and space technologies are rapidly advancing, integration of aerospace priorities is critical to the future benefit of both.

### Chinese ASATs won’t cause crisis escalation – As China increases space militarization, asymmetry will decline, stabilizing deterrence

MacDonald 2008 – Council on Foreign Relations [Bruce, Council Special Report No. 38 September China, Space Weapons, date accessed : June 24th, 2011, http://www.cfr.org/china/china-space-weapons-us-security/p16707]

Having crossed a space Rubicon with their ASAT demonstrations, neither nation can un-invent these capabilities. As the United States approaches major security policy reviews with the advent of a new administration in early 2009, both it and China face fundamental choices about the deployment and use of such capabilities, and the development of more advanced space weapons.2 The United States and China stand at a crossroads on weapons and space: whether to control this potential competition, and if so, how. While the United States is likely well ahead of China in offensive space capability, China currently is much less dependent on space assets than the U.S. military, and thus in the near term has less to lose from space conflict if it became inevitable. China’s far smaller space dependence, which hinders its military potential, ironically appears to give it a potential relative nearterm offensive advantage: China has the ability to attack more U.S. space assets than vice versa, an asymmetry that complicates the issue of space deterrence, discussed later. This asymmetric Chinese advantage will likely diminish as China grows increasingly dependent on space over the next twenty years, and as the United States addresses this space vulnerability. Thus, the time will come when the United States will be able to inflict militarily meaningful damage on Chinese space-based assets, establishing a more symmetric deterrence potential in space. Before then, other asymmetric means are available to the United States to deter China, though at possibly greater escalatory risk. That is, the United States could threaten to attack not just Chinese space assets, but also ground-based assets, including ASAT commandandcontrol centers and other military capabilities. But such actions, which would involve attacking Chinese soil and likely causing substantial direct casualties, would politically weigh much heavier than the U.S. loss of space hardware, and thus might climb the escalatory ladder to a more damaging war both sides would probably want to avoid.War between China and the United States seems unlikely, given their increasing economic interdependence and ongoing efforts in both countries to improve relations.

## 2NC China Adv – Plan Causes Weaponization

### Turn - US space militarization will cause China to weaponize – they are focused on deterrence now, but will react to US provocations

MacDonald 2008 – Council on Foreign Relations [Bruce, Council Special Report No. 38 September China, Space Weapons, date accessed : June 24th, 2011, http://www.cfr.org/china/china-space-weapons-us-security/p16707]

In a number of fora and military writings, China has unofficially indicated that the United States should not underestimate China in space or its ability to respond to U.S. military space initiatives that China perceives as a threat. Chinese specialists have stated that, in addition to protecting their satellites against U.S. offensive capabilities, China will develop a deterrent space force if there is no change in U.S. space policy, which they see as shunning any restrictions and reflecting U.S. attraction to space dominance. They have suggested that China would be prepared to deploy sufficient offensive counterspace capability to build confidence in its ability to deter U.S. use of weapons against Chinese space assets. This would not require China to match U.S. space-force deployments, but to have enough to deter. In general, as the CFR-sponsored Independent Task Force report on U.S.-China relations noted in 2007, “China does not need to surpass, or even catch up with, the United States in order to complicate U.S. defense planning or influence U.S. decision-making in the event of a crisis in the Taiwan Strait or elsewhere.”5 This could reflect Chinese thinking on space weapons, as well. China has openly announced its intention to build “informationized armed forces and being capable of winning informationized wars by the mid-twenty-first century;”6 offensive counterspace capabilities would be an important component in this capability. Coordinating and executing any such attack would be difficult and fraught with danger for China. Some are concerned that an action-reaction cycle involving space weapons could result in an “arms race in space,” even without actual conflict, making both the United States and China worse off than if neither went down this path.

## 2NC China Adv – Not a Threat

### Chinese ASAT tests are not a signal of a threat – they are reactions to US militarization and intended to spark negotiations

Mackey, 2009 - Air Force Institute of Technology [Accessed on 6-21-11 Fall Birmingham- Southern College;; Deputy group commander at Eglin AFB, Florida -Air and Space Power Journal “US and Chinese Anti-satellite Activities” proquest]

China's ability to strike a relatively small satellite with a kinetic-kill vehicle at a significant altitude clearly demonstrates technological prowess. What could motivate such a dramatic action? Kenneth S. Blazejewski proposes several possible interpretations of Chinese space-weapons activity. First, it signals a strong concern regarding the United States' continuing development of a ballistic missile defense shield and that country's possible weaponization of space. He points to the leveraging effect that such a system could impose on Chinese missiles in the event of an attack on Taiwan. Blazejewski further states that such an obvious ASAT test, in Chinese eyes, could lead to a negotiation to deweaponize space. Alternatively, as James Oberg stipulates, destruction of the Feng Yun might encourage the US Congress to sign a treaty banning the use of ASAT weapons, which would clearly follow Chinese strategy of employing an asymmetric approach to negate a US advantage.18 Second, according to Blazejewski, China may perceive that the United States seeks to deny it the use of space and is therefore pursuing ASAT capabilities to meet that challenge. Third, he suggests that China simply seeks to establish parity with US and Russian ASAT capabilities.19

## 1NC Hegemony Advantage 1/2

### No space weaponization now – International agreements solve

Denmark 2010 - Fellow with the Center for a New American Security [By Abraham M. and Dr. James Mulvenon CNAS, Jan, Contested Commons: The Future of American Power in a Multipolar World)

Space’s militarization — its use as a medium to support military operations — has existed for more than four decades. Since the height of the Cold War, satellites have monitored nuclear tests and other military activities and facilitated global communications, mapping, and other activities with both military and scientific purposes. Yet space has yet to be weaponized, in that it is not yet a theater for warfare or for the placement of arms, and it remains a global commons open to any actor with the means to access it. 36 To a large degree, this openness can be credited to a robust set of international agreements that effectively codify space as a global commons. When space first became accessible to humanity in the 1950s, the United States proposed an agreement establishing orbits as common spaces beyond traditional conceptions of sovereignty. The Soviet Union initially disagreed, arguing that its sovereign claim over its territorial air space extended to orbit and beyond. Once Moscow saw the benefit of sending satellites into orbit to spy on the West, its conceptions of its sovereign interests changed, and the USSR agreed to establish space as, in effect, a global commons. Although several arms-control agreements helped to solidify space as a commons, the most comprehensive existing international agreement on the use of space is the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. It defines space as an area beyond claims of state sovereignty, but it has a limited focus on military matters — beyond banning weapons of mass destruction in orbit or on any celestial body, and prohibiting the use of celestial bodies for military bases or the testing of weapons. U.S. policy has consistently embraced space as a global commons “by all nations for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of all humanity.” 37 Yet the United States has also defended space as a legitimate medium for defense and intelligence activities. The 2006 National Space Policy reinforced an American commitment to the “exploration and use of outer space by all nations for peaceful purposes, and for the benefit of all humanity,” rejected claims of national sovereignty, and reaffirmed the “rights of passage through and operations in space without interference.” On the issue of military objectives, it was quite clear, asserting: The United States considers space capabilities — including the ground and space segments and supporting links — vital to its national interests. Consistent with this policy, the United States will: preserve its rights, capabilities, and freedom of action in space; dissuade or deter others from either impeding those rights or developing the capabilities intended to do so; take those actions necessary to protect its space capabilities; respond to interference; and deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to U.S. national interests. 38

### US space dominance hurts hegemony – causes backlash – legal approach solves better

Bellflower 10, instructor at the Advanced Space Operations School [Air Force Judge Advocate General School. The Air Force Law Review. The influence of law on command of space name: major john w. Bellflower Lexis Accessed June 21, 2011]

Whether or not the United States is the "preeminent" military power in the world has become irrelevant. 231 American power troubles the rest of the world. 232 Even our allies find little assurance in the historical absence of armed conflict among fellow democratic societies, 233 and worry about the concentration of power in the hands of [\*144] a single country. 234 The United States unintentionally exacerbates this concern by expressing an ill-defined desire to control, master or "command" space. Going forward, a sensible strategy must rely on mechanisms of international law to craft an acceptable definition of command of space. Such a definition would comport with our national security and international law, and thereby avoid needlessly generating additional competitors and adversaries. Similarly, agreement to ban kinetic effects in space would address international concerns while concomitantly mitigating a portion of the known danger to U.S. space assets. A de facto ban on kinetic weapons in space would likely face opposition in the U.S. military, although such opposition is shortsighted. A lawfare strategy to achieve command of space without resort to the most destructive of weapons would allay some if not most of other nations' fears. But the primary basis for this proposal is to advance effective security of American space lines of communication, while interacting with our potential adversaries. As Sun Tzu advised, "that which depends on me, I can do; that which depends on the enemy cannot be certain." 235 A ban on kinetic effects in space will in no way guarantee that an adversary will never employ so called space weapons in the future. Nevertheless, because our own use of such weapons will generate debris, the United States should act regardless of this uncertainty and in doing so would continue to retain the ability to respond non-kinetically in space and kinetically on earth. Such a ban would find strong support in international law, and could possibly and practically eliminate the threat of space debris from kinetic weapons entirely.

1NC Hegemony Advantage 2/2

### Space Hegemony is impossible – inherent vulnerability

MacDonald 2008 – Council on Foreign Relations [Bruce, Council Special Report No. 38 September China, Space Weapons, date accessed : June 24th, 2011, http://www.cfr.org/china/china-space-weapons-us-security/p16707]

Some are attracted to a U.S. posture of dominance in space, and such a vision has superficial appeal. However, this attraction overlooks the serious difficulties that accompany it. Space assets are far more difficult to defend than to attack, and it will be well within China’s capability in the mid term to prevent the United States from attaining a dominant space position. Already China’s economy is growing as fast as that of the United States in absolute terms. One may wish otherwise, but the United States will not be able to maintain its near monopoly on space power into the future, though perhaps, with smaller margins, it can remain preeminent in space for many years to come. The United States faces an attractive space future if it does not let the best be the enemy of the good. U.S. space superiority is possible, but space dominance is not likely. Ground-based offensive assets are more survivable, and hence less destabilizing in a crisis, and are also likely to be less expensive and more reliable. Conversely, space-based offensive assets are vulnerable and have significant potential for crisis instability, offering huge incentives for adversaries to strike first. Thus, what the United States chooses to acquire as its offensive capability should first be evaluated against these criteria, as well as those suggested on page twenty.

### The plan doesn’t solve – it only protects military satellites, but leaves commercial satellites vulnerable

Putnam, 2009 Maj. United States Air Force - Marine Corps Command and Staff College [Christopher, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA510842&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf Countering the chinese threat to low earth orbit satellites: Building a defensive space strategyOMB No. 0704-0188

Finally, the United States must not stop at applying these recommendations merely to military satellites. While government satellites are critical in a conflict, commercial satellites in all orbital regimes have become an integral part of military operations to include weather, imaging, and communications. Although tightly tied to the world economy, China could decide to expand its anti-satellite program to attack the economic interests of the United States. While commercial satellites companies typically incorporate protective measures against natural threats, the United States government should share best practices and provide incentives to commercial entities to protect themselves against human threats. The government could do this through requirements to obtain licensing or guaranteed government contracts to companies that comply.

## 2NC Hegemony Adv – Plan Causes Arms Race

### Turn – plan speeds the Space Arms race – it makes it impossible to criticize China’s tests and causes massive backlash at US unilateralism

Milowicki 2008 United States Naval War College [with Freese Strategic Choices: Examining the United States Military Response to the Chinese ASAT Test, Astropolitics, Volume 6, Issue 1 January 2008 JSTOR]

Current U.S. space and counterspace policy and doctrine makes it difficult for the U.S., particularly the military, to protest very loudly regarding China's test. The U.S. has been developing and has been in possession of ASAT technology for over 45 years. Furthermore, other dual-use “defensive” systems such as the Airborne Laser and National Missile Defense systems can easily be applied to the offensive ASAT task. China and the rest of the world are keenly aware of this. In fact, it is a much easier physics problem to target and destroy a single orbiting satellite in a fixed path than it is to engage a ballistic missile with its many multiple independently targeted reentry vehicle (MIRV) warheads. Also, it is unlikely other countries have forgotten that the most aggressive and spectacular ASAT test in history was executed in the Cold War and involved the detonation of a 1.4 megaton thermonuclear warhead in LEO above the Pacific Ocean. This event, known as Starfish Prime, took place on 9 July 1962. The resulting electromagnetic pulse took out six U.S. and foreign satellites (i.e., about one third of the world's LEO total at the time) and knocked out over 300 streetlights on the island of Oahu in Hawaii while producing an eerie artificial glow in the sky for 20 minutes for the entire world to see.31 If comparing immediate negative impact due to the 10% increase in overall known debris created by the Chinese test, the January 2007 ASAT event can be viewed as relatively minor. It should also be noted that at the time of the Starfish Prime test, the knowledge base regarding potential debris created from ASAT tests was far less than it is now. With the most assets to be negatively impacted by debris, the U.S. has good reason to be attentive now that the issues are known. In the case of the Chinese test, it appears increasing likely that Chinese space debris experts were not consulted prior to the test, and that debris estimates generated by test supporters in the military likely downplayed whatever debris information was provided to politicians. This supports the view that the test was a “chest-thumping” exercise by the PLA and hardliners in China. The U.S. defense establishment's reaction to the ASAT test is guided and constrained by the National Space Policy of 2006 and the military doctrine that proceeds from it. Specifically, under paragraph 2 of the National Space Policy, one of the principles (cited below) clearly gives the military a mandate to react as it currently has to bolster both its defensive and offensive counterspace capabilities. Two underlying principles of the policy that are typically cited as unilateral and jingoistic by critics read as follows:32 The United States considers space capabilities—including the ground and space segments and supporting links—vital to its national interests. Consistent with this policy, the United States will: preserve its rights, capabilities and freedom of action in space; dissuade or deter others from either impeding those rights or developing capabilities intended to do so; take those actions necessary to protect its space capabilities; respond to interference; and deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to U.S. national interests. The United States will oppose the development of new legal regimes or other restrictions that seek to prohibit or limit U.S. access to or use of space. Proposed arms control agreements or restrictions must not impair the rights of the United States to conduct research, development, testing, and operations or other activities in space for U.S. national interests.33 While the principle of preserving its rights, capabilities and freedom of action in space is absolutely reasonable for the U.S. to claim, the language of the principle makes it unclear if other countries are expected to be able to claim similar rights or if they accrue only to the U.S. If the latter, it is not reasonable to expect that other countries will forego the same rights claimed by the U.S. Regarding the second principle, rejecting arms control, this language makes public what has been U.S. government policy since the Space Commission Report first questioned whether space arms control was in the interest of the U.S. Given that the rest of the world regularly votes in support of resolutions toward preventing an arms race in space through the United Nations (UN), with the U.S. standing alone against those resolutions, this principle becomes perceived as another example of the U.S. ignoring the perspectives of other countries in favor of a unilateralist approach—not necessarily an effective approach if the U.S. is trying to get the rest of the world to accept it as a benevolent hegemon in space. Intentionally or not, this bellicose and overtly unilateral section of the document has effectively tied the hands of the U.S. military establishment in diplomatically or politically responding to actions too negatively. Perhaps, in order to provide more options, the policy should be revisited in light of geopolitical realities. With only a few changes, the U.S. could alter its course and establish the U.S. as a constructive player in the international community rather than as a perceived “bad actor” bent on preemptive and hegemonic use of space for its own purposes;34 a perception that possibly prompts or, at a minimum, provides an excuse for bad actions on the part of other countries. Theresa Hitchens' observation in her Congressional Testimony of 23 May 2007 captures the situation. She states, “if nothing else, U.S. declaratory policy gives Beijing an excuse to pursue a similar course. China's actions—despite its public dedication to the non-weaponization of space—make it abundantly clear that U.S. space dominance strategy will not go unchallenged.”35

## 2NC Hegemony Adv – No Weaponization Now

### Threats to US space assets are potential, not actual. No nation poses a Credible threat

Hui 07 - Research associate at Harvard University [Zhang http://www.wsichina.org/space/focus.cfm?)focusid=94&charid=1 Space Weaponization And Space Security: A Chinese Perspective Accessed June 24

The United States does have legitimate concerns about its space assets, given that U.S. military operations, economy and society are increasingly dependent on space assets and such assets are inherently vulnerable to attacks from many different sources. However, it does not mean that the United States currently faces credible threats from states that might exploit those vulnerabilities.6 Further, space-based weapons cannot protect satellites, since these weapons are also vulnerable to many types of attack, similar to the satellites requiring protection. The true aim of U.S. space plans is not to protect U.S. assets but rather to further enhance American military dominance. Prof. Du Xiangwan, vice president of the Chinese Academy of Engineering, recently presented his view that the Transformation Flight Plan indicated that “many types of space-based weapons will be developed,” and “the tendency toward space weaponization is obvious and serious.” He further noted that military dominance on Earth is not enough, “the U.S. also seeks to dominate space.”7 Beijing fears that by unilaterally developing missile defense systems and pursuing space weaponization, the United States is seeking to establish a global military superiority using both offensive and defensive means.8 Moreover, China’s fears about U.S. hegemonic tendencies are exacerbated by the fact that space weapons, due to their vulnerability to other less expensive, asymmetric measures, are inherently first-strike weapons. 9

## 1NC Space Treaty Counterplan

### The United States federal government should support the amendment of the Outer Space Treaty to interpret the Peaceful Purposes provision as a prohibition on the testing, use or deployment of weapons in space.

### Focusing the Outer Space Treaty on weaponization prevents an arms race – it gives signatory nations the political will to adopt it, while recognizing military realities

Maogoto 07, Senior Lecturer in International Law, University of Newcastle [ Connecticut Journal of International Law. Winter,: the final frontier: the laws of armed conflict and space warfare. Name: Jackson Maogoto and Steven Freeland. Lexis Accessed June 21, 2011]

The "peaceful purposes" provision set out in Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty has been the subject of much analytical discussion as to its scope and meaning. While there is general agreement - but not complete unanimity - among space law commentators that this is directed against "non-military" rather than merely "non-aggressive" activities, the reality has, unfortunately, been different. 114 It is undeniable that, in addition to the many commercial and scientific uses, outer space has and continues to be used for an expanding array of military activities. 115 Unless concrete steps are taken to arrest this trend - which will require a significant [\*181] shift in political will, particularly among the major powers of the world - it is likely that space will increasingly be utilized to further the military and strategic aims of specific countries, particularly as military and space technology continues to evolve and develop. In this context, if one were to adopt a hard-line pragmatic (and non-legal) view of the current situation, one could suggest that the "non-military v. non-aggressive" debate is a redundant argument, even though it represents an extremely important issue of interpretation of the strict principles set out in the Outer Space Treaty. Indeed, the focus of much discussion now centres (as it should) on issues involving the "weaponization" of space - witness the numerous United Nations General Assembly Resolutions on that issue. 116 In one sense, this assumes that the militarization of space is a given, as much as it pains international and space lawyers to admit this. Of course this is highly troubling and flies in the face of the principles of the Outer Space Treaty. 117 Yet, it would be naive to ignore the realities - what must be done is, instead, to understand what legal principles currently apply to any military activities in space and what more needs to be done to provide, at least from a regulatory perspective, an appropriate framework to protect humankind from what could otherwise be unimaginable scenarios.

## 2NC Solvency 1/2

### Focusing international law on weaponization prevents escalation – it helps distinguish dual use satellites. Even if space militarization is inevitable, space law can make it so space War is not.

Maogoto 07, Senior Lecturer in International Law, University of Newcastle [ Connecticut Journal of International Law. Winter,: the final frontier: the laws of armed conflict and space warfare. Name: Jackson Maogoto and Steven Freeland. Lexis Accessed June 21, 2011]

In this context, several commentators have opined that space warfare is, in fact, inevitable and cannot be avoided. 136 If these suggestions turn out to reflect reality, the principles of the laws of war must be applied to any such actions. It is not clear how this should be done in practice or what consequences follow. Especially considering that an important group of space assets used for military purposes are "dual-use" satellites - which also provide "civilian" communications, [\*184] remote sensing, and GPS services. 137 Inevitably, one is drawn to the question of whether, and in what circumstances, such a satellite might now be regarded as legitimate target of war. Whether space warfare is inevitable and cannot be avoided will depend upon a number of fundamental principles of international law. Clearly, the physical destruction of a satellite would constitute a use of force. Apart from a consideration of the principles in the various space treaties, one would have to determine whether such an action represented a legitimate (at law) use of force, with the only possible justification being Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. 138 This issue would be determined by a consideration of the necessity and proportionality, as against the armed attack and threat of further attacks, of the act of self-defence. Even if the action did not violate these jus ad bellum principles, one would then need to consider the jus in bello principles raised earlier. Let us assume, for example, that a combatant takes the view that a dual-use satellite, for example, a communications satellite, represents a legitimate military objective in accordance with the principles outlined above. Even if this were a correct assessment, the principle of proportionality would continue to apply, so that injury and damage to civilians and civilian property should not be disproportionate to any expected military advantage. Moreover, one could argue that implicit in the principle of distinction is the obligation on the parties to a conflict to take "all feasible precautions" to protect civilians from the effects of an attack. 139 One can certainly envision that the deliberate destruction of such a target, even if it does not result in any immediate civilian casualties, would have a devastating impact on a community, country or even a region of the world. Millions of lives and livelihoods could potentially be affected, economies destroyed and essential services incapacitated. Obviously, some of the consequences of such an attack may be difficult to foresee, but such action would, one could argue, be regarded at least as reckless. However, there are uncertainties as to whether a "recklessness" test is applicable in the determination of the proportionality principle. 140 Given the unique nature of outer space, the principles under the jus in bello, developed as they were largely to regulate terrestrial warfare and armed conflict, are probably neither sufficiently specific nor entirely appropriate to military action in outer space. Even though every effort should be made to define the existing principles as clearly as possible, the looseness of some of the fundamental concepts, as well as the [\*185] resistance they face from certain States, 141 means that more specific rules are required if they are to provide a comprehensive framework to protect outer space from becoming another theatre of warfare.

2NC Solvency 2/2

### Focusing the Outer Space Treaty on weaponization can prevent space conflict – clarifying definitions can prevent misperceptions about attacks on space assets

Maogoto 07, Senior Lecturer in International Law, University of Newcastle [ Connecticut Journal of International Law. Winter,: the final frontier: the laws of armed conflict and space warfare. Name: Jackson Maogoto and Steven Freeland. Lexis Accessed June 21, 2011]

So important are space systems to military operations that it is unrealistic to imagine that they will never become military targets. Just as land dominance, sea control, and air superiority have become critical elements of current military strategy, space superiority is emerging as an essential element of battlefield success and future warfare. An increased dependence on space capabilities may lead to increased vulnerabilities. As space systems become lucrative military targets, there will be a critical need to control the ways in which space is utilized in future armed conflicts. Although the existing jus in bello principles, which also apply to outer space, provide some underlying standards that regulate the utilization of space for the purposes of armed conflict, the unique nature of space requires that the applicable rules be strengthened and particularized towards the environment of space. For example, with the exception of those Treaties that seek to ban the use and testing of certain types of weapons, there are many uncertainties that arise when one seeks to apply these principles to a (at this stage hypothetical) space conflict. The consequences of a space war are potentially so enormous that one cannot be sure as to exactly how these rules - for example, the principle of proportionality - will apply. In doing so, if we are to avoid 'grey areas' in the law, it is necessary to develop specific and clear rules and standards that categorically sanction the weaponisation of space, as well as the engagement in any form of conflict in the region of space and against space assets. The Outer Space Treaty, as well as the other space treaties and General Assembly Resolutions, do not currently provide stringent rules nor incentives to prevent an arms race in outer space, let alone conflict in space. This may, therefore, require additional space law regulation directly applicable to armed conflict involving the use of space technology. As part of these new rules, clear definitions need to be developed for concepts such as 'space weapons', 'peaceful purposes' and 'military uses'. Moreover, the fundamental issue of 'where space begins' should be definitively resolved so as to counter any arguments that outer space is, in fact, an area akin to the territory of a State for the purposes of national security. Even more significantly, in developing these new rules, we need to adhere strictly to the 'collective humanity' principles inherent in both the jus in bello and the international law of outer space in order to avoid the possibility of alternate scenarios too frightening to contemplate.

## 2NC Permutation

### Militarization violates the Outer Space Treaty – it undermines the peaceful uses of space

M2 Presswire 2005 [Oct 19 Delegates express concern over ever-expanding military use, weaponization of outer space as Fourth Committee continues general debate; Defence-related activities compound problem of orbiting debris, speakers say]

MA XINMIN (China) said that, while humanity was achieving notable progress in the peaceful uses of outer space, it was faced with the daunting challenge of ever-expanding military use of outer space, the increasing danger of its weaponization and the ongoing research and testing of space weapons. Those practices were against the principle of peaceful uses of outer space, as set out in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, and also contrary to the Space Millennium Declaration adopted at UNISPACE III. Hopefully, the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space would strengthen its efforts in opposing space militarization, prevent an arms race in outer space and explore ways to establish a comprehensive and effective legal mechanism.

### Clear Treaty law is necessary to prevent space warfare – militarization is inevitable and needs regulating

Maogoto 06, Senior Lecturer in International Law, University of Newcastle [Paper 1347. The Military Ascent into Space: From Playground to Battleground: The New Uncertain Game in the Heavens. Jackson N. Maogoto. University of Newcastlle. Bepress legal series <http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=6239&context=expresso> Accessed 6/23/2011.]

In the coming couple of decades, space warfare may well be a reality; this requires the formulation of a new perspective on the law of war. There is need for either an entirely international agreement on the complete prohibition of space weapons or at least the conclusion of a protocol to the outer Space treaty to this effect. This will eliminate the need for academicians and practitioners to making educated but uncertain guesses based on analogies with other legal regimes. The need for clear, coherent legal limitations in space is summed up by Colleen D. Sullivan’s astute observation that despite the fact that customary law, which has evolved in the last few decades since human-created objects began orbiting the earth and is based on principles designed to keep weapons out of space, the international community must codify them in treaties to assure that weapons remain out of the space environment. The author concurs enthusiastically with this observation. After all, this has been the general intent of the international community, evidenced by countless statements, numerous declarations and resolutions and the general tenor of the space law regime.